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ABSTRACT 
One of the lessons the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) has learned from the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, is to be prepared for the inevitable. As one of the world’s 
most renowned emergency response agencies, the FDNY can and should be the model of 
preparedness for any disaster that may affect New York City (NYC). Historical and 
scientific data confirms the very real threat of a low frequency, high risk earthquake 
affecting the NYC region. Potential for devastation is compounded due to the complexity 
of NYC’s infrastructure and the vast population unfamiliar with this type of natural 
disaster. The formulation of an FDNY pre-plan for a high-risk earthquake scenario based 
on extensive information-gathering and the assembly of a dedicated focus group will 
lessen the impact of a powerful quake while minimizing losses to lives, property and 
emergency responders themselves. By being prepared for the seemingly inevitable, the 
FDNY can live up to its role as one of the world’s most respected emergency response 
agencies.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, were an unexpected and tragic event; a “black swan.” 
If these attacks have taught us anything, it is to be prepared for the unimaginable. One 
seemingly unimaginable disaster is an earthquake affecting America’s largest city, the 
city of New York. History and scientific data has shown that New York City (NYC) is 
susceptible to a seismic event between magnitudes of 4.7 and 7.0. Due to the low 
frequency of quakes in the NYC region, the complexity of its infrastructure, the lack of 
specific earthquake driven building codes and the unfamiliarity of its citizens and 
emergency responders with this type of event, the potential for extensive loss of life and 
livelihood can be considered much greater compared to other, more prepared cities 
located in known seismic zones.  
As one of the world’s most renowned emergency response agencies, the FDNY 
can and should be the model of preparedness for an earthquake in NYC. Whether the 
epicenter of the quake is within the city itself or hundreds of miles away, the potential for 
devastation is great. That potential is compounded by factors such as NYC’s vast 
population, variety of structures, complex infrastructure, aged utility network and 
dependence on a multitude of bridge and tunnel connections. In order to prepare the 
FDNY for such an event, threats related to earthquakes are made known, vulnerabilities 
specific to NYC analyzed, FDNY response considerations reviewed and case studies of 
recent earthquakes in urban areas similar to NYC are performed in this thesis.  
Ultimately, activities such as committing resources, pushing for public 
information campaigns, securing funding and overhauling existing FDNY Manuals to 
account for an earthquake scenario is not the answer. The low frequency of earthquakes 
in the northeast and expected political and media opposition will not allow these 
overbearing solutions. More reasonable, however, is the formulation of an FDNY pre-
plan for a high-risk earthquake scenario. By putting together a focus group, gathering 
information from field units and engaging in regular meetings and table-top exercises 
with Department heads, the FDNY can live up to its role as one of the world’s most 
 xvi
respected emergency response agencies and continue its commitment to the protection of 
life and property of New Yorkers, becoming truly prepared for the unthinkable. 
 xvii
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On August 23, 2011, the residents of New York City (NYC) experienced the 
tremors of an earthquake. According to Fox News, “no damage was reported, but 911 
calls flooded [the police call lines] and jammed the wireless phone networks.”1 Although 
no one was hurt as a result of the earthquake, there was a spike in calls to both New 
York’s 911 and 311 lines in the hours following the event.2 The source of the tremors 
was a 5.8-magnitude earthquake with an epicenter in central Virginia, about 38 miles 
northwest of Richmond.3 This occurrence raised serious questions as to the vulnerability 
of New York to a major seismic event. First, are East Coast cities generally susceptible to 
earthquakes or was this event an anomaly? Second, how was the Virginia quake felt by 
people as far away as New York? Third, is the NYC area directly prone to quakes, aside 
from tremors that travel hundreds of miles, and, finally, are NYC’s residents and 
infrastructure vulnerable to seismic loads? More important questions involve the 
capabilities of first responders should another seismic event occur. What would be the 
short-term and long-term implications for service disruptions throughout the NYC’s five 
boroughs? What dangers can be avoided or pre-planned for considering the vast network 
of underground gas mains and electric conduits? How can the Fire Department of New 
York (FDNY) manage water supply to fight fires following the likely destruction of 
water mains throughout the city? And finally, how can crucial resources, including 
personnel, be distributed to areas of need in a city largely connected by bridges and 
tunnels?  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Earthquakes can and do occur in and around the NYC area. Such seismic activity, 
although infrequent, should not be overlooked. It is inevitable that one day the citizens of 
                                                 






America’s largest city will experience a moderate to severe earthquake and it is 
imperative that first responders of NYC and surrounding jurisdictions have a plan of 
action for this black swan. The August 23, 2011, magnitude (M) 5.8 earthquake 
frightened many New Yorkers.4 A Columbia University study conducted by Lynn Sykes 
and other members of the Lamont-Doherty Observatory analyzed recent earthquake 
activity around NYC and found that many small faults previously believed to be inactive 
could contribute to a major, disastrous earthquake.56 The study also found that a line of 
seismic activity comes within two miles of the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, located 
about 25 miles north of NYC.7 Another fault line near the plant was already known, 
suggesting the Indian Point facility to be at an intersection of faults.8 According to Dr. 
Lerner-Lam, head of the Lamont-Doherty Division of Seismology at Columbia 
University, “we do expect earthquakes to occur here, not as frequently as in California, 
but [the August 23 quake] is not a surprise.”9  
Fault lines within the New York area are not the only problem. Concerning the 
geology of the East Coast, W. Craig Fugate, Administrator of FEMA, stated that “the 
hard rock transmits the energy of the earthquake longer distances.”10 As proved by the 
tremors felt on August 23, 2011, an earthquake with an epicenter in a rural area hundreds 
of miles away could have far-reaching effects on a major city such as NYC. To 
compound the problem in this scenario, due to the geology of the East Coast and the 
                                                 
4 USGS.gov. “Magnitude 5.8 – VIRGINIA,” (August 23, 2011). 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/se082311a.php. 
5 Lynn R. Sykes. “Earthquakes May Endanger New York More Than Thought, Says Study,” Lamont-
Doherty earth Observatory. (August 5, 2008). http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/news-events/earthquakes-
may-endanger-new-york-more-than-thought-says-study.  
6 “Study Finds New Earthquake Dangers for NYC.”NBCNEWS.com. (August 23, 2008). 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26361143/ns/us_news-life/t/study-finds-new-earthquake-dangers-
nyc/Msnbc.com.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  





resultant spread of seismic waves, aid cannot be relied on from adjoining jurisdictions as 
these cities and towns may also be overwhelmed from the effects of the quake. 
As the attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated, failure to expect the 
unexpected can have disastrous consequences. Earthquakes can and do affect the NYC 
area, however sparingly they occur. In fact, the lack of familiarization with earthquakes 
along the eastern seaboard can prove to be especially problematic as the population, 
unlike their west-coast counterparts, will be unprepared for seismic tremors. It is for this 
reason that a plan of action for an earthquake response is warranted and as one of the 
most dependable and experienced emergency response agencies in the world, the FDNY 
should become the model for this level of preparedness.  
It would be unjustifiable for the FDNY to use much of its limited financial 
resources and training activities to prepare for an event that may or may not occur in its 
current members’ lifetimes. However, this does not mean that its members should be 
caught off-guard. By formulating a plan of action among the FDNY’s most senior 
leaders, the Department will be able to respond quickly and effectively in the event of a 
moderate to severe earthquake in or around NYC. Additionally, on-duty training of field 
units can be facilitated utilizing the Fire Department’s “Diamondplate” training website 
while mid-level supervisors develop creative solutions to local problems during 
scheduled building inspection and drill periods. One of the most important ways to begin 
preparing for this event is by exposing the city’s vulnerabilities, while forming a plan of 
action based on previous earthquake responses in other major urban areas. By emulating 
the successes and identifying the failures of other emergency response departments, as 
well as exposing NYC’s vulnerabilities, the highest ranking members of the FDNY can 
draw probable conclusions regarding what they are likely to face in the event of a similar 
devastating earthquake and truly be prepared for the next black swan. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To expose NYC’s vulnerabilities, the causes, consequences and characteristics of 
earthquakes must be identified. Well known by many science professionals as a leading 
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authority on earthquakes, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) is a science 
organization that strives to provide impartial information on the health of the ecosystem 
and environment, natural hazards, natural resources and climate and land-use change.11 A 
fact-finding research organization with no regulatory responsibility, the USGS employs 
approximately 8,670 scientists, researchers and experts and is headquartered in Reston, 
Virginia.12 This organization informs authorities, emergency responders, the media and 
the domestic and worldwide public about significant earthquakes. It also maintains 
archives of earthquake data for scientific and engineering research, while supporting 
studies on long-term seismic hazards.13  
According to historical records provided by the USGS, a number of earthquakes 
have had negative effects for residents of the New York area. Though the historical 
evidence of earthquakes throughout the northeastern portion of the U.S. is undeniable, 
past events do not predict, with certainty, the future. Given the statistical nature of 
seismic events, geologists generally have an aversion to unduly alarming the populace.14 
In a New York Times interview with Dr. Arthur Frankel, a seismologist with the USGS 
in Colorado, in response to the question of whether NYC is susceptible to an earthquake, 
Dr. Frankel stated that “the quake hazard in this [NYC] region is significant… it isn’t as 
high as it is in California, but because of the high population and the built-up 
infrastructure, the risk is significant.”15 The facts illustrate that New York’s largest city 
has experienced earthquakes in the past and, since the forces that generate quakes have 
not disappeared, it can be assumed that NYC will experience such tremors in the future. 
Ruth Ludwin, a research scientist with the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN) 
tends to agree with members of the USGS. PNSN is an organization dedicated to 
reducing impacts of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in the states of Washington and 
                                                 
11 USGS.gov. http://www.usgs.gov/aboutusgs. 
12 USGS.gov. “USGS Visual Identity System.” http://www.usgs.gov/visual-id/outside_use.html. 






Oregon. According to their website, the mission of the PNSN is to monitor ground 
motions within the region to better understand earthquakes, provide the most accurate 
information as rapidly as possible to public officials and the public, and advocate 
comprehensive and cost-effective measures for reducing the harmful effects of 
earthquakes and volcanoes.16 According to the PNSN, although a great deal is known 
about where earthquakes are likely, there is currently no reliable way to predict the days 
or months when an event will occur in any specific location.17 And so, although a quake 
is likely to affect NYC in the future, there is no reliable way of knowing exactly when 
this will occur. 
Many sources can be utilized to prepare NYC first responders for an impending 
earthquake. The first is the official manuals of the FDNY. These books contain no 
specific standard operating procedures (SOP) for earthquake response; however, they do 
provide instruction for individual situations involving building collapse, gas leak 
mitigation, fire control and basic water flooded conditions. Although these manuals 
provide effective SOP’s at the tactical level, more needs to be accomplished strategically. 
A focus group and information-gathering headed by the most senior levels of the 
Department are recommended to prepare for such an event. Case studies, including 
failures and successes in earthquake response across the globe, are analyzed and 
earthquake-specific topics such as tsunamis, aftershocks and the need for specialized 
rescue procedures assessed.  
NYC’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) website contains a section 
dedicated to earthquakes, stating that, “although earthquakes are uncommon in New York 
City, tremors occasionally occur, and residents should be prepared.”18 OEM provides a 
very basic overview for the public should an earthquake occur, including ways to identify 
safe places in the home, keeping clear of windows and preparing the home by securing 
                                                 
16 PNSN. http://www.ess.washington.edu/SEIS/PNSN/INFO_GENERAL/eq_prediction.html. 
17 Ibid. 
18 NYC OEM. http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/hazards/earthquakes.shtml. 
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heavy objects. OEM states that after an earthquake “your utilities may be disrupted.”19 
NYC’s true vulnerability due to its aged infrastructure and utility network must be given 
consideration. NYC’s vast network of water pipes, steam pipes, gas lines and 
underground and overhead electric lines combined with tunnels, bridges and buildings, 
some over a century old, will be a major problem during a moderate or severe quake. 
Ownership of these utilities has changed often throughout NYC’s history, and maps, if 
made available to emergency managers during an operation, may not always be reliable 
and in many cases, may even be inaccurate. 
In order to ensure FDNY response procedures are effectively analyzed, a number 
of different sources, from online content to earthquake-specific literature, are utilized and 
over one-hundred sources cited. Literature authored by Kate Ascher, an expert in studies 
of government, corporate finance and economic development, is extensively cited, as she 
provides detailed descriptions of the various portions of NYC’s infrastructure. The USGS 
is used for a vast amount of earthquake-related data as official engineering, utility and 
government online content assist in the analysis of New York’s building design, essential 
services, population and special projects. Additionally, magazine articles, periodicals and 
news reports are utilized to provide in-depth details surrounding circumstances of various 
earthquakes across the globe. Finally, sources citing post-quake actions taken by 
international response teams and government agencies are reviewed and compared to the 
FDNY’s current SOP’s.  
According to a Fox news report regarding the latest tremors felt by NYC residents 
during the Virginia quake in August, 2011, “though we hardly felt any movement here in 
the city of New York as a result of the earthquake, panic seemed to overtake a lot of 
people, as indicated by various news programs and social networking sites. A single 
tremor was enough to cause mass confusion, building evacuations and cell phone service 
outages across the city.”20 This is an example of the level of unpreparedness NYC faces. 
                                                 
19 NYC OEM. http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/hazards/earthquakes.shtml. 
20 Manny Alvarez. “Earthquake Proves NYC Is Not Prepared for Natural Disasters.” Foxnew.com. 




The FDNY needs to adopt a new level of pre-planning and resource allocation in the 
event of this black swan event. The attacks of September 11, 2001 proved that a vast 
metropolitan area like NYC should be prepared for the inevitable, and as the leading 
NYC emergency response agency, the FDNY should be the model of this level of 
preparedness. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the FDNY Prepare for a High Risk, Low Frequency Seismic Event in 
New York City? 
D. METHOD 
The occurrence of an earthquake with an epicenter in or around the city of New 
York is a very real possibility. However, due to the low frequency of past quakes in the 
NYC area, extensive data for the true seismic hazard is lacking. Additionally, historical 
records portray earthquake effects during a time when the population, buildings and 
infrastructure of NYC differ than what exists today. An analysis of the major threats 
facing NYC is conducted through research of earthquake-related events such as tsunamis 
and aftershocks. The anatomy of NYC is explored utilizing numerous published books 
and web resources. Coupled with FDNY established standard operating procedures, 
weaknesses in NYC’s infrastructure can be identified and plans formulated for dealing 
with these problems. Finally, the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant is assessed and 
potential dangers analyzed using various articles, studies and expert opinions. 
In order to formulate an effective strategy for dealing with this potential black 
swan, case studies of recent earthquakes in various cities, similar in size and scope to 
NYC, are performed. Though it is generally accepted that the United States’ ability to 
respond exceeds most other countries due to its technological and financial standing, and 
superior building codes, in relation to other members of the international community, 
these case studies still provide useful benchmarks for evaluating particularly devastating 
quakes. An analysis of the challenges posed to responders of modern urban centers in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, as well as a critique of urban emergency response systems, 
8 
 
provides valuable information, allowing emulation of successes and avoidance of 
failures. The specific case studies are analyzed as follows as each incident involved a 
“modern-day” emergency response within a major city comparable to NYC:21 
 Port-Au-Prince, Haiti Earthquake; January 12, 2010: A city devastated by 
a recent earthquake that relied heavily on highly trained United States 
(U.S). personnel for rescue and recovery is examined. The Port-Au Prince 
quake shows the devastation that can result from unprepared communities 
located in low-income areas. NYC itself has many such communities 
throughout its various boroughs and though building codes are more 
stringent, public and communal reaction to this quake deserves 
consideration. This event is analyzed to show the mass devastation that 
may occur in the immediate aftermath of a very powerful quake. Positive 
aspects of this specific case study revolve around the success of trained 
American response teams. The effort and speed involved in importing 
valuable human resources from America to a devastated area is evaluated 
and compared to what can be expected in NYC.  
 Chile Earthquake; February 27, 2010: An extremely large earthquake 
affecting a large number of cities along the Chilean coast, with most 
damage centered in Santiago, a large sprawling urban center, is examined. 
This earthquake affected a number of communities located along the 
Chilean coast, not unlike major cities surrounding NYC, along the U.S. 
East Coast. An after-action-review of the response proves helpful in 
formulating a strategy for dealing with a quake affecting the numerous 
populated cities along America’s East Coast. 
 Japan Earthquake; March 10, 2011: With Tokyo being a large, populated 
city, similar in scope to NYC including a vast underground subway 
system, and located in an earthquake-prone zone, there is much to be 
learned regarding Japan’s level of earthquake preparedness. Additionally, 
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team response to this specific event as 
well as the implications of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant melt-down 
are extensively analyzed. 
 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake; February 22, 2011: Occurring in 
a large, modern urban area similar to many parts of NYC, the response to 
the Christchurch quake was exemplary and a model for all emergency 
managers. This coastal, populated city that experienced a strong 
earthquake labeled as the second worst disaster in New Zealand’s history 
proves invaluable in analyzing the positive and negative aspects of 
                                                 
21 The building codes in some of the aforementioned case studies are significantly inferior as 
compared with NYC. As damage is caused by a complex interaction between ground motion and structural 
composition based on building codes, it can be expected NYC will fare considerably better than some of 
the cities studied (i.e., Haiti). 
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modern-day response capabilities following the aftermath of a seismic 
event.  
 Loma Prieta, California Earthquake; October 17, 1989: A widely 
publicized earthquake affecting populated coastal cities and towns most 
similar to NYC in American values and societal norms, as well as 
emergency response capabilities, is compared to the other case studies. 
Occurring in 1989, it is important to review lessons learned as well as 
technological developments since that time. This is the oldest case study 
reviewed but the one in which the most information is available and 
applicable. Additionally, civilian reaction, emergency response and media 
coverage of this event is comparable to what can be expected in NYC due 
to cultural similarities. 
An analysis of vulnerabilities is conducted, identifying specific problems first 
responders are likely to face including utility emergencies, bridge, tunnel and subway 
system collapse, hi-rise structure challenges, water supply disruption, and difficulty 
transporting necessary resources as well as acquiring recalled personnel and help from 
adjoining cities and jurisdictions. As NYC is a city of islands, easily cut off from one 
another should a quake destroy bridges and tunnels, each borough is given a potential 
hazard score based on its extent of vulnerability in areas ranging from population to 
number of unreinforced masonry structures. These scores are totaled, allowing FDNY 
management to prioritize resource allocation by borough in the event of a large, 
unexpected earthquake. 
A review of the case studies, along with an analysis of NYC’s vulnerabilities and 
specific FDNY pre-plan considerations result in a number of recommendations and 
implementations FDNY officials can utilize to enhance the Department’s capabilities. 
From local fire departments dealing with the aftermath of the Loma Prieta quake of 1989 
to emergency responders attempting to mitigate the nuclear meltdown caused by a 
tsunami off of the coast of Japan, much is gained by studying the successes and failures 
of various agencies located in seismic “hot-zones” and applying lessons learned to 
NYC’s own specific challenges. 
No city is an exact replica of NYC, but many of the cities that are analyzed in 
these case studies have similar features, including, but not limited to, skyscrapers, aged 
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infrastructure and underground subway systems. Through the use of articles, media 
reports, online journals and after-action-reviews, data is collected and critiqued. 
Emulating successful responses in these cases studies, while learning from mistakes, 
allows a competent strategic operating plan to be formulated. Additionally, data retrieved 
from online sources and acknowledged written material regarding population, 
infrastructure and response capabilities specific to NYC is used to formulate this strategy. 
Specific response considerations applicable to the FDNY are analyzed taking into 
account NYC’s geographic location, infrastructure, resources and past FDNY challenges. 
A thorough analysis of the aforementioned case studies coupled with data pertaining to 
the modern-day structure and infrastructure of NYC permits a dependable, effective plan 
to be formulated for this black swan event. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR THREATS 
A. EARTHQUAKE HAZARD IN NY 
Earthquakes are common natural events that occur every day, all over the world. 
They result from the motion of tectonic plates moving slowly over the mantle that slide 
past each other, push into each other, move away from each other, or slip under one 
another.22 It is on these active plate boundaries that about 95% of all the world’s 
earthquakes occur, with poorly understood mid-plate quakes (such as the New Madrid) 
making up the remaining 5%. Some of the most earthquake-prone areas of the world, 
including California, Alaska, Japan, South America and the Philippines are all on plate 
boundaries.23 The closest plate boundary to NYC is thousands of miles away in the 
middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Yet, despite its intra-plate location, the city has an 
unusually high number of earthquakes. With over one million quakes annually across the 
earth’s surface, most are too small to be felt.24 Table 1 shows the average frequency of 








                                                 
22 Center for Earthquake Research and Information. 
http://www.ceri.memphis.edu/awareness/follies.html. 
23 Ibid. 
24 “New York City Geology.” Earth and Planetary Sciences. http://research.amnh.org/eps/nycgeology. 
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Table 1.   Frequency of Differing Earthquake Magnitudes (From: Earthquakes and the 
Urban Environment, Vol. 1, G. Lennis Berlin, 1980). 
Description Magnitude Frequency per year 
Great 8.0+ 1 
Major 7.0–7.9 18 
Large (destructive) 6.0–6.9 120 
Moderate (damaging) 5.0–5.9 1,000 
Minor (damage slight) 4.0–4.0 6,000 
Generally felt 3.0–3.9 49,000 
Potentially perceptible 2.0–2.9 300,000 
Imperceptible less than 2.0 600,000+ 
 
Using the previous table, one can discern a rate of approximately 80,000 quakes 
per month, 2,600 per day and 2 per minute.25 These data can also be organized into 
exceedance probability plots. Exceedence probability is the likelihood that an event of 
specified magnitude will be equaled or exceeded in a defined period of time; in this case, 
per year. Figure 1 plots the exceedance probability against the quake size. Such plots 
allow one to estimate the annual likelihood of a particular earthquake magnitude 
anywhere in the world and as portrayed in Figure 1, though earthquakes are quite 
common, damaging quakes are rather rare.  
                                                 
































Figure 1.   Exceedance Probability Plot for Annual Earthquake Occurrence Worldwide. 
With approximately one earthquake occurring every 30 seconds, only a relative 
few are capable of causing damage. Though a number of factors affect the lethality of an 
earthquake and the amount of damage it can inflict, it is the confluence of multiple 
factors that create major consequences. Large quakes in populated regions with poor 
construction standards can have devastating consequences. The largest known earthquake 
measured an M 9.5 and occurred in Chile in 1960, resulting in over 6,000 deaths. 
Compare that to the great Alaska earthquake of March 27, 1964, the largest known 
earthquake to have occurred in the United States at M 9.2, which resulted in only 115 
deaths, most due to the tsunami it generated.26 The amount of energy generated during 
the 1964 Alaska quake, which generated ground surface movements between 2 and 17 
meters, was equivalent to 12,000 Hiroshima-type blasts, or 240 million tons of TNT.27 
                                                 
26 Center for Earthquake Research and Information. 
http://www.ceri.memphis.edu/awareness/follies.html. 




Earthquakes release a tremendous amount of energy which is why they can be so 
destructive. Table 2 displays earthquake magnitudes with the approximate amount of 
TNT needed to release the same amount of energy.  
Table 2.   Approximate TNT Energy for Differing Earthquake Magnitudes (From: 
Earthquakes and the Urban Environment, Vol. 1, G. Lennis Berlin, 1980). 
Magnitude Approximate TNT Energy
4.0 6 tons 
5.0 199 tons 
6.0 6,270 tons 
7.0 199,000 tons 
8.0 6,270,000 tons 
9.0 99,000,000 tons 
 
In some areas of the world, smaller earthquakes are responsible for the deaths of 
many thousands of people, primarily because of poorly designed buildings, unprotected 
infrastructure, large population density, and in many cases, lack of planning. Table 3 
demonstrates some of the major earthquakes that have occurred around the world in the 







Table 3.   Death Tolls of Major Earthquakes (From: Earthquakes and the Urban 
Environment, Vol. 1, G. Lennis Berlin, 1980). 
Year Date Region Deaths Magnitude 
1971 02–09 Southern California 65 6.5 
1972 12–23 Managua, Nicaragua 5,000 6.2 
1976 02- 04 Guatemala 22,000 7.9 
1977 07–27 Tangshan, China 250,000+ 7.6  
1980 03- 04 Romania 2,000 7.2 
1980 10- 10 Algeria 35,000 7.7 
1981 11–23 Southern Italy 3,000 7.2 
1982 06–11 Southern Iran 3,000 6.9 
1983 12- 13 Yemen 28,000 6.0 
1985 10- 30 Turkey 1,342 6.0 
1985 12- 07 Armenia 25,000 6.9 
1989 09- 19 Mexico 10,000 7.0 





Many individuals mistakenly believe that earthquakes only occur in other parts of 
the world and that their hometown is not susceptible. Some uninformed inhabitants of 
America’s East Coast may perceive seismic events as a “West Coast” problem. Nothing 
could be farther from the truth. All areas of the world are prone to seismic activity, 
though some more frequent, and disastrous, than others. A major problem results when 
this natural event occurs in or around a complex city with high population destiny, aged 
infrastructure and unprepared emergency response agencies. Unfortunately NYC may be 
especially susceptible to the disastrous consequences of an earthquake due to the low 
frequency, and resulting lack of familiarity, with these events. In order to properly assess 
the threat, it is important to analyze how likely it is for an earthquake to occur in or 
around NYC. To start, one must look back into NYC’s history.  
Novelist George Santayana has been quoted as saying “those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”28 The NY area has had a significant 
number of earthquakes since modern record-keeping began. Below is a short list put 
forward by the USGS detailing the history of earthquakes that have affected NYC.29 
 December 18, 1737:  An earthquake near NYC threw down a number of 
chimneys. The shock was reportedly felt in Boston, Philadelphia and New 
Castle, Delaware.  
 November 4, 1877: A rather severe earthquake centered in northeastern 
New York caused moderate damage along the St. Lawrence River and in 
the Lake Champlain. Crockery was overturned, ceilings cracked and 
chimneys were thrown down. The earthquake was felt throughout a large 
part of New York, New England and Eastern Canada.  
 May 27, 1897: A shock reported as severe, but with no damage noted, 
occurred in northeastern New York. It was felt over the greater portion of 
New York and parts of adjacent New England States as well as Quebec, 
Canada.  
 February 28, 1925: An M 7 earthquake shook a very large area of the 
northeastern United States and eastern Canada. A large portion of New 
York State experienced intense effects.  
                                                 
28 George Santayana. “Life of Reason, Reason in Common Sense,” Scribner’s, 1905, 284. 




 August 12, 1929: Extensive damage occurred in the Attica area from a 
strong shock. Chimneys were thrown down, plaster was cracked or thrown 
down, and other building walls were noticeably damaged. The earthquake 
was felt throughout most of New York and the New England states, 
northeastern Ohio, northern Pennsylvania and southern Ontario, Canada. 
Additionally, an increased flow at the Attica reservoir was noted for 
several days after the earthquake and a number of wells near the reservoir 
went dry. It should be noted here that an earthquake hundreds of miles 
from NYC can cause a number of problems involving the city’s 
infrastructure including water supply and the power grid.  
 November 1, 1935: A strong earthquake centered near Quebec, Canada 
caused slight damaged at many points in New York. The damage was 
limited, in general, to plaster cracks, broken windows and cracked 
chimneys. The shock was felt throughout New York, as far south as 
Washington, D.C., and as far west as Wisconsin.  
 December 24, 1940: An earthquake centered near Lake Ossipee, New 
Hampshire caused widespread, though slight, damage in the epicenter-
region. The damage extended into Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island 
and Vermont. The shock was felt over all of New York State. 
 September 4, 1944: An earthquake centered about midway between 
Massena, New York and Cornwall, Ontario was felt over all of the New 
England States, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
portions of Michigan and Ohio. A few points in Illinois, Indiana, Virginia, 
West Virginia and Wisconsin also reported feeling the tremor. 
 January 1, 1966: An M 4.7 disturbance caused slight damage to chimneys 
and walls at Attica and Varysburg, NY. Plaster fell at the Attica State 
Prison and the main smokestack was damaged.  
The historical records confirm that earthquakes in other areas of NY, and even the 
continental U.S., can have far-reaching effects for the residents of NYC. Some scientists 
believe that the greatest earthquake risk east of the Rocky Mountains is along the New 
Madrid fault system, a fairly active zone located in the Midwestern portion of the United 
States.30 Figure 2 illustrates the risk of damage from earthquakes in the United States. 
Although NYC is in a low risk zone for the origination of quakes, it borders other high 
risk zones that may well transmit significant seismic loads to the NYC area. Additionally, 
even though damaging earthquakes are much less frequent along the East Coast than in 
                                                 




California, when they do occur the damage can be far greater due to the underlying 
geology.31 A series of four great earthquakes occurred in the Central United States 
between December 16, 1811 and February 7, 1812. All had estimated magnitudes greater 
than M 7.5.32 Collectively known as the New Madrid Earthquakes, effects were felt over 
an estimated 2 million square miles, far greater than any other recorded quake in the 
United States.33 Because of the small number of people living in the area at the time, 
however, fewer than 100 deaths were recorded.34 The quake caused extensive damage to 
structures and extraordinary changes to land surfaces throughout the region, as well as 
sending shockwaves as far away as Boston, Massachusetts.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Risk of Damage from Earthquakes in the U.S.  (From: Stearns and Miller, 
1977). 
 
                                                 







The records clearly show that seismic activity hundreds of miles from the New 
York area has affected NYC residents as well as neighboring jurisdictions. The 
earthquake threat, however, also exists within the vast metropolitan area itself. The last 
major quake within NYC occurred more than a century ago on August 10, 1884, at 7:07 
p.m.35 An earthquake measuring M 5.2 on the Richter Scale had its epicenter in New 
York Harbor south of Rockaway Beach, toppling chimneys, ringing church bells and 
breaking crockery from Connecticut to Pennsylvania.36 Its effects were noted from 
Virginia to Maine. According to Dr. Arthur Frankel, a seismologist with the USGS in 
Colorado, “That size event would cause much more damage now due to the greater 
population, proliferation of buildings and infrastructure.”37 According to Dr. Frankel, 
some geologists believe the quake like the one that occurred in NYC in 1884 may occur 
once every 50 to 100 years, with a stronger M 6 quake potentially striking every 400 to 
500 years.38 The last quake of that size occurred at Cape Ann off the coast of 
Massachusetts in 1755.39 According to Dr. Frankel, the effect of a major quake in the 
NYC area “is something we need to worry about and prepare for.”40 The latest data 
shows that New York, New Jersey and Connecticut are riddled with ancient geological 
faults and one of the most visible faults crosses the island of Manhattan at 125th Street, 







                                                 









NYC area is at the middle of the scale of lowest to highest hazard in analyzing the 
potential for earthquakes.41 Figure 4 further portrays the earthquake hazard along the East 
Coast.42 
 
Figure 3.   USGS National Seismic Hazard Map 2008. (From: The USGS. 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/product). 
                                                 
41 These maps are the basis for seismic design provisions of building codes, insurance rate structures, 
earthquake loss studies, retrofit priorities and land-use planning. Their use in design of buildings, bridges, 
highways and critical infrastructure allows structures to better withstand earthquake shaking, saving lives 
and reducing disruption to critical activities following a damaging event. “Hazard Mapping Images and 
Data,” USGS. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/products. 





Figure 4.   Earthquake Hazard Areas across the East Coast. (From: The USGS. 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/ceus/). 
In Dr. Frankel’s opinion, the effects of a severe earthquake in Manhattan could be 
more profound than those in the West because on the East Coast, the earth’s rocky crust 
is older, cooler, more rigid and capable of transmitting more powerful shock waves in 
comparison to the younger Western bedrock.43 The lack of anticipation or knowledge 
regarding earthquakes in the NY region is also a problem. Many individuals hastily call 
911 when something is amiss but are ill prepared to be self-sufficient following a large-
                                                 




scale disaster. Dr. Won-Young Kim, a senior research scientist at Lamont-Doherty Earth 
Observatory of Columbia University, is the director of a seismic network that monitors 
earthquakes in the New York region. Dr. Kim employs a network of scientists and 
volunteers who give anecdotal reports of the shaking effects of earthquakes, such as four 
small seismic events, less than M 1, which took place from Dec. 12 to 14 in 2004. In a 
New York Times Interview discussing these tremors, Dr. Kim stated “people certainly 
felt them; there were 150 calls to police.”44  
Table 4 illustrates the potential impact of a variety of earthquake scenarios in and 
around New York City as modeled in the New York City Area Consortium for 
Earthquake Loss Mitigation (NYCEM) Study published in 2003.45 In the case of an M 6 
earthquake, which is considered a moderate event, the total devastation for the Tristate 
Area (NYC, NJ and CT) is quite high, in all a total economic loss of almost $40 billion. 
                                                 
44 “Understanding Hazards in the Central and Eastern U.S,” USGS, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/ceus/. 




Table 4.   A Summary of the Findings of the NYCEM Report. (From: Division of 














M-5 $4.4 b $0.4 b $4.8 b 24 13 2,800 500 45 1.6 m 
tons 













13,171 6,705 766,746 1,200 12,800 132.1 
m 
tons 
100-year $0.1 b $0.1 b $0.2 b 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 m 
tons 
500-year $6.1 b $2.0 b $8.1 b 28 14 575 50 100 3.1 m 
tons 




1,430 727 84,626 900 2,200 34.0 
m 
tons 








Historical evidence and scientific research has demonstrated NYC’s susceptibility 
to a powerful quake, however, initial ground motion is not the only seismic-related 
danger which may result in devastation. An analysis of additional earthquake-related 
events such as aftershocks and tsunamis is required, as well as a closer look at the 
geology located beneath America’s largest city, to truly understand the magnitude of the 
threat. 
                                                 
46 The New York City Area Consortium for Earthquake Loss Mitigation, 
http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oem/mitigation/archive/documents/S3.I.vi_Earthquake_Hazard_Profile.pdf. 
47 NOTE: For this report the events of September 11th 2001 are used as a real life benchmark to be 
able to make a comparison for the listed earthquake scenarios. 
48 This is the total number killed in the attacks on the WTC in NYC. This does not take into account 
deaths outside of the tri-state area that day or deaths related to 9–11 illnesses. “9/11 By the Numbers,” 




Aftershocks are a series of smaller earthquakes occurring after the larger, main 
earthquake in the same area of the main shock. This type of seismic activity is usually the 
result of the crust around the displaced fault plane adjusting to the effects of the main 
earthquake. If the aftershock turns out to be larger than the main shock, then it is re-
designated as the main shock, with the original labeled a foreshock. Bigger earthquakes 
tend to have more frequent and larger aftershocks which in some cases can last for years 
or even longer. The New Madrid Seismic Zone, cause of the August 23, 2011 quake felt 
in NYC, still encounters aftershocks resulting from the main shocks of 1811–1812.49 The 
problem with aftershocks is threefold. For one, overall damage is compounded as 
structures and infrastructure weakened by the main quake become more prone to 
subsequent destruction, even if the aftershocks are of much smaller magnitude. A 
building designed to withstand tremors of an M 5 may collapse during an M 3 aftershock 
if its foundation and/or connections are disturbed during the main earthquake. The second 
problem with aftershocks is the danger to rescuers. Firefighters performing a void search 
of a collapsed building, or controlling a fire caused by a ruptured gas main, may be 
placed at further risk should an aftershock occur during operations. This not only puts 
rescuers in danger, but it reduces the impact of the overall rescue mission as other first 
responders spend time and energy saving their own instead of the general population. 
Finally, aftershocks are likely to cause panic among survivors and a disregard for 
authority as victims may come to distrust directions from agency leaders (i.e., sleeping in 
the streets as opposed to Safe Refuge Areas set up by authorities.) 
Most scientists agree that an aftershock sequence is deemed to have ended when 
the rate of seismicity drops back to a background level. In his published work, Fusakichi 
Omori describes the temporal decay of aftershock rates. In summary, aftershock 
frequency decreases in relation to the reciprocal of time after the main shock.50 Although 
                                                 
49  “Earthquake Definitions,” Rutherford County Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, 
http://www.rutherfordcountytn.gov/ema/definitions_earthquake.htm. 
50 F. Omori (1894), “On the Aftershocks of Earthquakes,” Journal of the College of Science, Imperial 
University of Tokyo 7: 111–200. 
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the rates of aftershocks tend to follow patterns, the occurrence, rate and magnitude of 
these tremors remain quite unpredictable. Some aftershocks may occur hours after the 
main even while others take years to occur. Overall, according to Omori’s equations, the 
rate of aftershocks decreases quickly with time, and agency leaders should plan with this 
in mind.   
C. LIQUEFACTION 
Based on seismic records, a number of geologists accept that there is ongoing 
tectonic activity in the Northeast U.S. An earthquake here would invariably affect a much 
wider area and create more damage than what has traditionally been seen on the West 
Coast because the Earth’s crust in the eastern states can transmit seismic energy more 
efficiently. In fact, for any given earthquake magnitude the resultant ground shaking in 
the east can reach distances three to six times further, affecting areas 10 to 40 times 
greater than in the western U.S.51 The transmission of energy, however, is not the only 
problem challenging unwary East Coast residents. During the May 25, 1988 M 6 
Saguenay earthquake of Quebec, “liquefaction” was observed at a distance of 15 ½ miles 
from the epicenter, approximately ten times larger than the maximum distance observed 
in the west during similar magnitude earthquakes.52 Liquefaction is a phenomenon 
whereby a saturated soil loses strength and stiffness due to an applied stress, such as 
shaking, as a result of an earthquake. This geological process can undermine structures 
and cause extensive damage as saturated, unconsolidated sediments are transformed into 
a substance that acts like a liquid.  
Earthquakes are a common cause of liquefaction where loosely packed, water-
logged sediments come loose from the intense shaking of the quake. This process is more 
likely to occur in loose to moderately-saturated granular soils with poor drainage, such as 
                                                 
51  Geotechnical Engineering Bureau: NYS DOT, “Liquefaction Potential of Cohesionless Soils,”  
(April 2007). DOT.NY.GOV https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/engineering/technical-services/technical-
services-repository/GDP-9b.pdf. 





“silty sands or sands and gravels capped or containing seams of impermeable 
sediments.”53  As shown in Figure 5, every borough of NYC contains the type of geology 
susceptible to liquefaction with major portions of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens 
containing significant amounts of soft soils.54 These areas deserve special attention when 
formulating response plans for an earthquake scenario. Other features of seismic hazards 
unique to the East Coast include lack of surface faulting (potential loci of future quakes 
are not well known), higher high-frequency content of seismic ground motions to large 
distance, and higher contrast of shaking on soft soils versus underlying hard rock (high 
site amplification).55 One of the most dangerous consequences of a powerful earthquake 
is the process of liquefaction. 
 
                                                 
53 “Liquefaction Resistance of Soils: Summary Report from the 1996 NCEER and 1998 NCEER⁄NSF 
Workshops on Evaluation of Liquefaction Resistance of Soils,” Journal of Geotechnical and 
Geoenvironmental Engineering 127 (10): 297–313.  
54 “Rock and Soil Types in the Region,” NY / NJ / CT Earthquake Risks and Mitigation, 
http://www.nycem.org/techdocs/FinalReport/13rock.pdf. 






Figure 5.   Ground Composition of NYC and Surrounding Areas. (Available at 
http://www.nycem.org/techdocs/FinalReport/13rock.pdf). 
NEHRP SOIL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Green: Hard Rock 
Yellow: Rock 
Brown: Dense Soil / Soft Rock 
Pink: Soft Soils 
Red: Special Soils 
 
D. TSUNAMI 
Most experts believe that the chances are slim that citizens of New York will ever 
experience a destructive tsunami like the one that struck Japan following their 2011 
earthquake. However, Steven Ward, a professor at the University of California Santa 
Cruz’s Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, and his co-author, Simon Day of 
University College London, released a paper in 2001 detailing the possibility of a tsunami 
hitting New York as well as the entire eastern coast of the United States. Unlike the 
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Japanese tsunami, this one could be set off by a catastrophic failure of the west flank of 
the Cumbre Vieja Volcano in the Canary Islands, off the coast of Africa.56 The size of the 
resulting tsunami will depend on the magnitude of the resultant landslide, and whether it 
occurs quickly or in phases. Ultimately, Ward anticipates wide swaths of Manhattan, 
Brooklyn, Long Island, New Jersey and Staten Island to be underwater following this 
disaster.57 Fortunately, even if this event does occur, Americans along the East Coast will 
most likely be warned thanks to modern monitoring and communication technology, and 
will have enough time (approximately 9 to 10 hours) to evacuate, saving thousands of 
lives.58 
The potential for a tsunami as a result of an earthquake is a different problem 
altogether. Some geologists warn that there are several active undersea areas, called 
subduction zones, off of both of America’s coasts, which could trigger a massive 
tsunami. Alaska has been hit repeatedly by these enormous waves, as has Hawaii. Dr. 
John Rundle, the director of The Center for Computational Science and Engineering at 
UC Davis, agrees that “the risk for tsunamis….is very real and very present and very 
possible.”59 Although Dr. Rundle agrees this event is not likely, he confirms that 
somewhere in the world, a devastating tsunami has happened “about every 5,000 to 
10,000 years.”60 More likely, however, would be a moderate to severe quake occurring 
off the coast of, and in proximity to, NYC. This event could trigger a fairly large tsunami 
close to the major metropolitan area’s shores, with little warning to residents, and 
virtually no reaction time for responders. Current standard operating procedures, and 
evacuation plans for flood-prone areas in NYC during hurricanes and powerful storms, 
should be reviewed and possibly expanded to take into account flooding as a result of an 
earthquake-induced tsunami. To put things into perspective, Table 5 shows the 
                                                 
56 Dan Amira, “Oh, By the Way, an Enormous Tsunami Could Strike New York City,” New York 
(March 15, 2011), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2011/03/oh_by_the_way_an_enormous_tsun.html. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 





probability of a tsunami occurring within 500 and 5000 years, respectively. The dangers 
presented by a tsunami striking NYC’s coastal areas merit further study and should be 
part of the FDNY’s strategic earthquake response plan. 
Table 5.   USGS Probability of Earthquake Occurrence for Non-Subduction Zones off of the 
U.S. Atlantic Coast. (From: U.S. States and Territories National Tsunami Hazard 
Assessment).61 
 
State/Territory Earthquake with 
Magnitude 
> 6.5 in 500 years 
within 50 
km of coast 
Earthquake with 
Magnitude 
> 6.5 in 5000 years 
within 50 





shore or offshore 
Maine <3% <30% <6 
New Hampshire <3% <30% <6 
Massachusetts <3% <25% <6 
Rhode Island <2% <15% <6 
Connecticut <2% <30% <6 
New York <4% <30% <6 
New Jersey <4% <30% <6 
Delaware <3% <15% <6 
Maryland <2% <15% <6 
Virginia <1% <4% <6 
 
 
E. INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
NYC is susceptible to an accidental release of radiation from a variety of sources. 
Universities, colleges and hospitals all contain various radioactive materials, but the 
                                                 
61 Paula K. Dunbar, Craig S. Weaver, “U.S. States and Territories National Tsunami Hazard 




dangers posed by these facilities are generally minimal compared to the potential hazards 
posed by the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, just 24 miles north of NYC.62 According 
to a 2011 report, federal watchdogs made safety at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant 
their top priority and New York’s Governor stated that he wants the aging nuclear power 
plant shut down in the midst of its two remaining nuclear reactors being up for 
recertification in 2013 and 2015.63 The ability of this facility to withstand seismic activity 
is certainly questionable. The Governor recently met with Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) officials to discuss Indian Point’s ability to withstand an earthquake 
beyond its design limits.64 The Indian Point plant, which has had its share of problems in 
the past including a leaking underground pipe feeding a backup cooling system and a 
transformer explosion which triggered a brief shutdown, is reportedly designed to 
withstand an earthquake up to an M 6.1.65 That is greater than the most powerful New 
York quake recorded at M 5.2 in 1884.66 More importantly, scientists at Columbia 
University have discovered that the Indian Point facility is within a mile of where New 
York’s two most active fault lines intersect and a 2008 paper reported the estimated 
chances of an M 7 earthquake occurring at this intersection to be 1.5% over a 50-year 
period.67 The Columbia paper also noted that Indian Point is located “closer to more 
people” than any other nuclear plant in America, at one of the least favorable sites from 
an earthquake hazard and risk perspective.68  
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Nuclear power has generally proved safe when it comes to human health, but 
when something goes wrong, it can result in widespread radioactive exposure and health 
hazards that can turn an average power plant mishap into a disaster reminiscent of 
Chernobyl.69 Radiation is invisible and cannot be tasted, smelled or felt.70 There are four 
primary kinds of ionizing radiation; alpha, beta, gamma and x-ray. Alpha particles are 
relatively heavy and, when emitted, cannot penetrate human skin or clothing, but are 
harmful if they get into the body via inhalation, ingestion or other methods.71 Beta 
radiation can cause skin injury and is also harmful to the body internally. Gamma and X-
rays are high-energy radiation that can damage tissue and are considered the most 
hazardous to humans.72 Concerning the possible spread of radiation from malfunctioning 
nuclear power plants, most experts anticipate a gradual exposure over time.73 If leaking 
occurs, the local population could breathe in particles or ingest contaminated foods with 
radioactive elements causing widespread radiation sickness and death.74 An effective 
earthquake response plan for any area located in proximity to a nuclear power plant must 
take into account the possibility of significant, widespread, high dose radiation exposure 
and contamination. 
A nuclear meltdown at the Indian Point plant can certainly pose significant 
hazards to the citizens of NYC, yet dangers of day-to-day activities using radioactive 
substances cannot be overlooked in the event of an earthquake. A study from the National 
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement found that nearly half of the radiation 
to which the U.S. population is exposed comes from medical sources such as CT scans, 
X-rays and nuclear medicine.75 Prolonged exposure to radiation is dangerous and the 
                                                 











farther away an individual is from the source of radiation, the less exposure that person 
will have to the damaging radioactive particles or waves.76 To this effect, the FDNY has 
adopted the principles of time, distance and shielding for routine radiological incidents 
and this policy should be implemented during disaster mitigation following a moderate or 
severe earthquake. An accidental radiological release which occurs due to an earthquake 
poses a significant threat to the health and safety of first responders operating at incidents 
in and around hospitals, universities and other research and healthcare institutions, and 
should be taken into consideration when assessing the threats to NYC during a seismic 
event. 
                                                 




III. CASE STUDIES 
A medium to large earthquake occurring in or around NYC is a high risk, yet low 
frequency event. As shown in Table 4, an M 6 can result in a total loss of $39.3 billion 
for the Tristate area. Compare that to $5.7 billion in lost gross city product as a result of 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012.77 Because of the low frequency of this event, an abundant 
amount of data portraying the seismic hazard in NYC is not readily available. Historical 
records of earthquakes in the New York area cannot be analyzed to determine successful 
response strategies, as these quakes occurred in a time when the population, buildings 
and infrastructure of NYC were substantially different than they are today. In order to 
pre-plan an effective response in the event of this black swan, a case study must be 
performed analyzing various earthquakes occurring in similar large cities, in a time frame 
comparable to present day. A review of the challenges faced by modern urban cities in 
the aftermath of an earthquake, as well as a critique of their emergency response systems, 
will prove invaluable in determining how to prepare the FDNY for a similar scenario.  
A. PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI EARTHQUAKE—JANUARY 12, 2010 
Port-Au Prince was truly unprepared for the severe tremors of January 12, 2010, 
and this resulted in mass devastation in the immediate aftermath of the very powerful 
quake. The city relied heavily on foreign aid and personnel for rescue and recovery and 
most positive aspects of the relief effort were the result of actions taken by trained 
international response teams. The logistics involved in importing valuable human 
resources from America and other countries to the devastated area played a key role in 
what little success occurred following the disaster. An analysis of the failures that 
occurred following this disaster will help emergency response planners avoid similar 
mistakes in their own communities. 
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Following the massive quake, the Haitian government reported over 200,000 
deaths, 300,000 injuries and 1,000,000 left homeless.78 The government of Haiti also 
claimed that 250,000 residential buildings and 30,000 businesses had collapsed or were 
severely damaged.79 Because of the shallow depth of the quake, shaking damage was 
more severe than for other quakes of similar magnitude. The days following the initial 
quake, the USGS reported over 50 aftershocks measuring M 4.5 or greater, including an 
M 5.9 aftershock lasting only seconds but panicking thousands.80 A tsunami warning was 
issued immediately after the initial quake, but subsequently cancelled. Two weeks later, 
however, it was reported, and later confirmed, that the small fishing town of Petit Paradis 
was hit by a localized tsunami wave shortly after the earthquake, sweeping three victims 
out to sea.81  
For days following the earthquake, civilians resorted to sleeping in the streets, 
automobiles and makeshift shanty towns, either out of fear of aftershocks or because their 
dwellings had actually been destroyed. Damage was especially excessive due to the low 
construction standards in Haiti and lack of building codes. Many buildings were built in 
areas considered hazardous even under normal conditions, with insufficient foundations 
or steel works. In the aftermath of the quake, police headquarters near the Toussaint 
L’Ouverture International Airport became Haiti’s base of political operations, although a 
number of government officials remained trapped in the Presidential Palace.82 Further 
hampering emergency response, many government workers focused on their own missing 
family members and tended to wounded relatives, leaving the government largely 
ineffective. Although the president and his remaining cabinet met with United Nations 
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(UN) planners daily, there was confusion as to who was in charge and no single group 
had organized relief efforts as of January 16, 2010.83  
Communication systems, hospitals, infrastructure networks and even land, air and 
sea transport facilities were severely damaged by the earthquake, hampering rescue and 
aid efforts. The quake seriously damaged the control tower at Toussaint L’Ouverture 
International Airport as well as Port-au-Prince’s seaport, leaving the harbor unusable for 
operations.84 In addition, air traffic congestion coupled with difficulty in prioritizing 
incoming flights further complicated initial rescue efforts. Ultimately, control of the local 
airport was handed over to the United States to hasten and ease air transport operations.85 
Hospitals throughout Haiti were left incapable of use, leaving many of the injured 
without proper care. The quake damaged all but one hospital in Port-Au-Prince leaving 
hundreds desperate for medical attention.86 The situation became so desperate that the 
UN provided an emergency generator for a hospital after discovering surgeries were 
being performed under candlelight without the use of electric equipment.87 Less than one 
week after the earthquake, a number of hospitals reported having expended their stocks of 
medical supplies, including antibiotics. The morgues of Port-au-Prince were quickly 
overwhelmed and a thousand bodies had been placed on the streets with government 
manned trucks utilized to bury the dead in mass graves. Additionally, above-ground 
tombs were forced open so bodies could be stacked inside while others were burned. As 
the rescue portion of the response transformed into relief efforts, supplies, medical care 
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and sanitation became priorities. Long delays in aid distribution brought about 
widespread frustration from survivors to rescue workers and looting and sporadic 
violence became commonplace in many areas. Some citizens constructed their own 
roadblocks to keep out looters while others resorted to vigilantism.  
Many government and public buildings were damaged or destroyed including the 
Palace of Justice, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court and even a prison, allowing 
4,000 inmates to escape.88 The National Palace was also damaged, with the president and 
his wife escaping injury.89 With no municipal petrol reserves and few city officials with 
working cell phones even before the quake, communications and transportation became 
extremely hampered http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Haiti_earthquake - cite_note-wp-
65#cite_note-wp-65. Considerable damage to Haiti’s communications infrastructure left 
the public telephone system unavailable, and two of Haiti’s largest cellular telephone 
providers, Digicel and Comcel Haiti, had their services disrupted by the earthquake.90 
Fiber-optic connectivity was damaged knocking radio stations off the air and some 20 of 
about 50 stations that were active in the capital region prior to the earthquake took about 
a week to get back “on air.”91  
Rescue efforts began immediately following the earthquake, with ambulatory 
survivors extricating their friends and neighbors from the rubble of collapsed buildings. 
Rescue work slightly intensified with the arrival of international rescuers, police and 
military personnel two days after the quake with numerous countries providing aid 
including rescue teams, medical teams, engineers and support personnel. The neighboring 
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Dominican Republic was the first country to offer assistance to Haiti, contributing clean 
water, food and heavy machinery, as well as making its hospitals available to the injured. 
Dominican airports were also made available for support operations. The Dominican 
Republic helped restore some of Haiti’s damaged telephone services and the Dominican 
Red Cross coordinated early medical relief as the government volunteered mobile 
medical units, including doctors of diverse specialties. Among the other resources sent to 
Haiti were trucks carrying canned food, mobile kitchens and cooks capable of producing 
thousands of meals per day. Other nations, from the United States to Qatar, sent 
personnel, medicine, material and other much-needed aid. A rescue team sent by the 
Israel Defense Forces’ Home Front Command established a field hospital near the UN 
building and the USS Carl Vinson arrived from America with relief supplies including 14 
helicopters.92  
In the end, over 20 countries had sent military personnel to Haiti. Initial rescue 
efforts were restricted by traffic congestion and debris until U.S. helicopters were brought 
in to distribute aid to areas impossible to reach by land. The International Charter on 
Space and Major Disasters was activated, sharing satellite imagery of affected regions 
with rescue and aid organizations.93 Even social networking websites, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, played a role in communicating the need for rescue in the aftermath.94 
Ultimately, it took a vast number of resources and a large part of the international 
community to mitigate the large earthquake that virtually destroyed Port-Au-Prince. 
Overall, it can be stated that this was an unsuccessful response by an ill-prepared country 
and emergency planners should look for ways to avoid repeating the numerous failures 
which occurred following this disaster. 
Failures:  
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 Poor construction standards 
 Mediocre infrastructure 
 Lack of leadership & direction from government officials 
 Danger underestimated (tsunami warning cancelled) 
 No pre-plan (body disposal, aide distribution, medical care, back-up 
command sites)  
 Looting/vigilantism 
 Poor hospital resiliency  
 Transport hubs severely incapacitated 
 Hampered communications and lack of communication resiliency 
 
Successes:  
 Timely aid on the part of the Dominican Republic and the international 
community 
 International military assistance utilized 
 Ocean vessels utilized to distribute large quantities of resources 
 Helicopters utilized to bypass damaged roads 
 Handing over airport control to the U.S. 
B. CHILE EARTHQUAKE—FEBRUARY 27, 2010 
The earthquake that occurred in Chile in February 2010, affected a number of 
cities along the Chilean coast, with most damage centered in Santiago, a large sprawling 
urban center. Though met by a significantly more effective response than the Port-Au-
Prince earthquake, there were still some notable strategic failures. A review of the 
emergency response to this earthquake, then, is useful in formulating a strategy for 
responding to quakes affecting numerous populated cities within the same geographic 
area, as could well be the case along the northeast coast of America. 
The 2010 Chile earthquake occurred on February 27, 2010, centered roughly two 
miles off the coast of central Chile, and was the sixth largest earthquake ever to be 
recorded by a seismograph. According to the USGS, at least 523 people were killed,  
24 missing, about 12,000 injured, 800,000 displaced and at least 370,000 houses,  
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4,013 schools, 79 hospitals and 4,200 boats damaged or destroyed by the earthquake and 
associated tsunami.95 The epicenter was just off the coast and the resulting tsunami 
devastated several coastal towns in south-central Chile. Having a magnitude of 8.8, the 
intense shaking lasted approximately three minutes.96 In the time period since the 
earthquake occurred at least 304 aftershocks M 5 or greater, with 21 of these M 6 or 
greater, have been recorded.97  
This was a far-reaching earthquake that affected many cities. After the earthquake 
struck, most of the deceased were buried under collapsed buildings or trapped inside cars. 
Buildings collapsed in the populated city of Santiago with power outages in many parts 
of the city. The city of Concepcion, cut off by damaged infrastructure, reported numerous 
damaged buildings and fires. A fifteen-story residential building known as “Alto Rio” 
toppled backwards, landing horizontally on the ground, trapping residents.98 Dilapidated 
buildings could be seen in the city of Temuco, 250 miles from the epicenter. Tsunamis 
struck a few hours after the quake, washing away entire fishing and beach communities 
including Constitucion, Curanipe, Pelluhue, and Dichato, and even partially obliterated 
industrial ports like Talcahuano.99 The ensuing tsunami reached as far as Tohoku, Japan, 
where damage to the fishing industry reached roughly $66 million. Thousands remained 
unaccounted for and, in the small town of Constitucion, at least 350 were swallowed by 
the sea http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-71#cite_note-
71.100 In Talca, with many dead trapped in the rubble and the administrative building 
uninhabitable, authorities had to improvise and set up government functions in the parade 
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ground http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-73#cite_note-
73.101 Overwhelmed hospitals attempted to transport patients to Santiago, but were 
turned back by blocked roads. Chileans living in regions distant from the earthquake, 
both in Chile and abroad, desperately sought to learn more regarding their family and 
friends affected by the earthquake as failure of electric cables and destruction of 
telephone lines hampered communications.   
Four hours after the earthquake, when the death count was still low, the Chilean 
President held a press conference informing viewers of the situation, mistakenly  
stating that Chile did not need international aid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-Impulsobaires-96#cite_note-Impulsobaires-96.102  
However, with approximately two million people affected by the earthquake and more 
than 500,000 houses uninhabitable it became clear that the people of Chile could not 
handle this disaster on their own. Throughout many urban areas people slept in tents, 
parks and on streets for fear of aftershocks. The government responded by distributing 
food and other vital aid to affected areas of the country http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-108#cite_note-108. 
The earthquake also caused a blackout affecting 93% of Chile’s  
population, lasting for several days in some locations. http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-12#cite_note-12 103 Chile’s president eventually 
declared a “state of catastrophe” and deployed the military to take control of most of the 
affected areas. Three hospitals in Santiago collapsed, and a dozen more south of the 
capital suffered significant damage.104 Santiago’s International Airport was also badly 
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damaged, resulting in cancellation all flight operations. Fortunately, by February 28, 
2010, some commercial airline services were re-established and allowed to land in 
Santiago.105  
Although mistakes were made, the government was largely effective in their 
response. Following the earthquake, almost half of the country was declared a 
“catastrophe zone” with curfews imposed in areas of looting and public disorder.106 
Looting occurred in places such as supermarkets http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-104#cite_note-104 and stolen goods ranged from 
necessities such as food to luxuries such as electronic items. As a result, special forces 
known as “carabineros” were sent to disperse rioters, using tear gas and water cannons 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-101#cite_note-101.107 
Curfews were put in place and arrests were made, but despite these measures,  
pillaging continued in both urban and rural areas of the affected zones 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Chile_earthquake - cite_note-Ya_son_723-
102#cite_note-Ya_son_723-102. As some neighborhoods began to form their own 
vigilante groups, legislative measures were adopted by the Chilean government 
increasing penalties for stealing during a state of catastrophe. In Concepcion, a prison riot 
began with different parts of the prison set ablaze, but was eventually brought under 
control with help from military units.  
Although mistakes were made, the Chilean government conducted an adequate 
emergency response. Problems were dealt with as they were recognized and failures 
corrected in a timely fashion. In this case, a strong central government was able to 
coordinate a response to a major disaster and many key decisions are worthy of 
emulation. 
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 No timely solution to assist communities initially isolated from outside 
assistance  
 Failure to initially recognize the magnitude of the disaster 
 Failed hospital resiliency 
 Looting/vigilantism 
 Prison riots 
Successes:  
 Parade grounds used for initial mustering sights 
 Government distribution of food and water 
  “State of Catastrophe” declared 
 Curfews and special forces utilized to handle public disorder 
 Successful use of military 
 Increased penalties for crimes during state of emergency 
 Successful evacuation for special hazards (chemical plant fire) 
C. JAPAN EARTHQUAKE—MARCH 10, 2011 
With Tokyo being a large, populated city similar in scale to NYC, including a vast 
underground subway system, and located in an earthquake-prone zone, there is much to 
be learned from Japan’s level of earthquake preparedness. Although prepared for large 
earthquakes and tsunamis in a number of different ways, there were failures in Japan’s 
emergency response strategy following the M 9 earthquake of March 10, 2011. Failure to 
anticipate the magnitude and scope of the consequences from this M 9 quake, Japan was 
plagued by numerous breakdowns in communications between the government and 
private industry that resulted in destruction far greater than anticipated. In addition, the 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant melt-down diverted emergency response resources to 
address the overwhelming consequences that a nuclear containment breech would entail. 
This had far-reaching implications for planning and emergency response strategies of all 
countries witness to the disaster. 
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On March 11, 2011, an M 9 undersea earthquake struck off of the coast of Japan 
with an epicenter approximately 231 miles northeast of Tokyo.108 Lasting approximately 
six minutes, it was the most powerful known earthquake to have ever hit Japan, and one 
of the five most powerful earthquakes in the world since modern record-keeping 
began.109 Occurring at a relatively shallow depth of 18.6 miles, the resultant tsunami 
waves reached heights of 37.88 m at Miyako in Tohoku’s Iwate Prefecture, and caused 
the majority of casualties in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima.110 At least 15,703 people 
were killed, 4,647 missing, 5,314 injured, 130,927 displaced and at least 332,395 
buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges and 26 railways were destroyed or damaged as a result 
of the earthquake and tsunami.111 The high death toll resulted from the tsunami, with an 
estimated 90% of deaths attributed to drowning.112 About 230,000 automobiles and 
trucks were damaged or destroyed in the quake http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T 
%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-202#cite_note-202.113  The damage 
persisted for some time with approximately 1.9 million households in Japan without 
electricity three days after the quake and 1.4 million households without water 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-
waterfoodheat-30#cite_note-waterfoodheat-30.114,115 Hundreds of aftershocks continued 
to batter the coast of Japan for the next two days following the M 9 earthquake, with 
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thirty of them measuring more than M 6.116 Following the disaster, Japanese Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan stated that,” [since the end of World War II] this is the toughest and 
the most difficult crisis for Japan” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5 
%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-29#cite_note-29. 117 
As destructive as the earthquake was, the devastation caused by the resulting 
tsunami was extraordinary. The tsunami warning issued by the Japan Meteorological 
Agency was the most serious on its warning scale http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-93#cite_note-93. 
Unfortunately, tsunami walls at several of the damaged cities were based on much 
smaller estimated tsunami heights and many people who thought they were on high 
enough ground to be safe were swept out to sea. At least 101 designated “tsunami 
evacuation sites” were struck by the wave.118 It is estimated that damage caused by the 
surging water, though much more localized, was far more deadly and destructive than the 
actual quake. There were reports of entire towns destroyed by the giant wave, including 
9,500 missing in Minamisanriku.119 The tsunami also resulted in a number of nuclear 
accidents, primarily meltdowns among the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant, with at least three nuclear reactors suffering explosions due to built-up 
hydrogen gas within the outer containment buildings after cooling system failure.  
As a result, hundreds of thousands of residents in surrounding areas were evacuated.  
The powerful tsunami ultimately spread throughout the Pacific Ocean region reaching  
as far as the coasts of North and South America from Alaska to Chile 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-
95#cite_note-95 . 
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Unfortunately, in earthquake-prone Japan, only about half of the people located in 
the coastal areas of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures heeded tsunami warnings 
immediately after the quake. Of the 13,135 fatalities recovered by April 11, 2011, it is 
estimated that 92.5% were victims of drowning and those 60 or older accounted for 
65.2% of the deaths, with 24% being in their 70s http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T 
%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-163#cite_note-163.120 
Approximately 100,000 children were uprooted from their homes, some of whom were 
separated from their families because the quake occurred during the school day 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-
165#cite_note-165.121 Google Person Finder, also used in the Haitian, Chilean and 
Christchurch, New Zealand earthquakes, was used to collect information about survivors 
and their locations.122  
The earthquake and tsunami ultimately resulted in an estimated 24 million tons of 
rubble and debris in the three hardest-hit prefectures.123 In north-eastern Japan there  
were fires in many areas, heavy damage to roads and railways, and at least one dam 
collapse. Approximately three hundred hospitals with 20 beds or more in Tohoku were 
damaged, with 11 completely destroyed http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T 
%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-199#cite_note-199.124 Traditional 
Japanese funerals, oftentimes elaborate Buddhist ceremonies utilizing cremation, were 
unable to occur as the thousands of bodies exceeded the capacity of available 
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crematoriums and morgues, many already damaged. Additionally, shortages of kerosene 
for cremation, and dry ice for preservation, further prohibited these ceremonies 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-
allen20110324-182#cite_note-allen20110324-182. Many bodies were disposed of in 
hastily-dug mass graves with little or no rites and the promise of cremation in the future.  
The rescue operation itself was not without difficulties. The prevalence of safe 
operations deserves to be questioned as three Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force 
members died while conducting relief operations in Tohoku http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-191#cite_note-191.125 By 
April 30, 2011, 18 deaths and 420 injuries were attributed to disaster recovery or clean-up 
efforts http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - 
cite_note-193#cite_note-193.126  
Around 4.4 million households served by Tohoku Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO) in northern Japan were left without electricity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-217#cite_note-217.127 
Additionally, several nuclear and conventional power plants went offline after the 
earthquake, reducing TEPCO’s total capacity and necessitating rolling blackouts. These 
blackouts of approximately three-hour blocks, which even affected Tokyo, were 
continued throughout April and May while TEPCO scrambled to find a temporary power 
solution http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - 
cite_note-221#cite_note-221.128 The earthquake and tsunami resulted in shortages  
of food, water, shelter, medicine and fuel for survivors. One year after the quake  
the Japanese government contributed 1,331 deaths to situations indirectly  
                                                 
125 “GSDF Relief-Duty Sergeant, 27, Dies,” The Japan Times. (May 28, 2011), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110528a9.html. 
126 Jiji Press, “Disaster Reconstruction Work has Claimed 18 Lives So Far,” Japan Times, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120606a2.html. 
127 Tsuyoshi Inajima, Yuji Okada, “Japanese Quake Forces Evacuation Near Nuclear Reactor; Oil 
Refinery Burns,”  (March 11, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011–03–11/cosmo-oil-refinery-set-
on-fire-nuclear-power-reactors-shut-by-earthquake.html. 




related to the earthquake, such as harsh living conditions following the disaster 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-
192#cite_note-192.129 
The rolling blackouts had a profound effect on the rail networks around Tokyo. 
This led to severe slowdowns within the capital, as long lines at train stations prohibited 
citizens from getting to work or home. All railway services were initially suspended in 
Tokyo following the earthquake, leaving approximately 20,000 people stranded at 
stations throughout the major city.130 Fortunately, most Tokyo area train lines resumed 
full service by the next day, with some services resuming just hours after the earthquake. 
All of Japan’s ports were closed for a brief period following the earthquake, though ports 
in Tokyo and areas further south were soon re-opened. Japan’s transportation network 
suffered extensive disruption and many sections of the Tohoku Expressway serving 
northern Japan were damaged and did not reopen to the general public for nearly two 
weeks.131 Sendai Airport was entirely underwater due to the tsunami after the initial 
quake, causing extensive damage, and Tokyo’s Narita airport was closed for about six 
hours, necessitating airborne planes to be diverted to other airports to ensure safe landing  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-
AVH1-98#cite_note-AVH1-98.132  
Further complicating emergency response, cellular and landline phone services 
suffered major disruptions http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5 
%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-288#cite_note-288.  Fortunately, Internet 
services were largely unaffected in areas that were not severely damaged by the quake, as 
these systems were able to reroute around affected segments onto redundant links. 
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Several Wi-Fi hotspot providers provided free access to their networks, while foreign 
telecommunications and VoIP companies offered free calls to, and in some cases, from, 
Japan for a limited time. As this particular earthquake resulted in serious damage to an 
extremely wide range of areas, Japanese broadcasters suspended usual programming to 
provide continuing coverage of the disaster. Warnings were broadcasted in up to five 
different languages and Japanese sign language was used at press conferences related to 
the earthquake and tsunami.133  
Many actions on the part of government and private business were successful 
following the massive earthquake. Japanese Self-Defense Forces, assisted by the 
international community, sent search and rescue teams to help search for survivors and 
the Japanese Red Cross reported millions in donations. Private companies helped in the 
recovery efforts with three steel manufacturers in the Kanto region contributing 
electricity produced by their in-house conventional power stations to TEPCO for 
distribution to the general public.134 In May following the quake, auto and auto  
parts makers in Kanto and Tohoku agreed to operate their factories on Saturdays and 
Sundays but close on Thursdays and Fridays to assist in alleviating the electricity 
shortage during the summer of 2011 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5 
%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami - cite_note-226#cite_note-226.135  
Much of the media coverage of this massive earthquake was focused on the well-
known Fukushima Daiichi crisis. A report from an independent panel stated that the 
nuclear emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi plant was a “profoundly man-made 
disaster,” the result of poor earthquake-safety planning and faulty post-tsunami 
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communication.136 Not surprisingly, TEPCO’s in-house panel claimed the nuclear crisis 
was unforeseeable, spurred by a giant, unimaginable tsunami. The report suggests that the 
M 9 earthquake itself may also have caused critical damage that led to the series of 
meltdowns, arguing facilities should have been made more quake-proof. It is believed 
that lax safety measures and a conformist culture allowing operation with little scrutiny 
were also to blame, as early warnings from outside watchdog groups regarding the 
significant safety risk posed by earthquakes went unheeded.137 Results of the 
investigation also found TEPCO’s disaster response manuals to be out-of-date and 
missing key diagrams.138 
Government and TEPCO employees were ultimately guilty of not foreseeing or 
preparing for the black swan. The report stated that the Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency (NISA) did not press TEPCO to prepare for the loss of main and backup power 
(i.e., a full station blackout) because the “probability was small.”139 Slow and faulty 
communication on the part of TEPCO and government officials after the disaster 
hampered the emergency response, ultimately resulting in significant radiation spread 
across 700 square miles of land.140 Actions following the quake were ineffective as 
TEPCO was too slow in relaying information to the government and the prime minister’s 
office waited too long to declare a state of emergency. Unaware of the severity of the 
situation, the prime minister traveled to the plant mid-meltdown and according to the 
report, “diverted the attention and time of the on-site operational staff and confused the 
line of command.”141 
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The lack of communication and failure to prepare for the “worst-case” scenario 
were factors hindering an effective response from an otherwise very prepared country. As 
a nation familiar with devastating earthquakes and tsunamis, one can only hope future 
leaders will heed the warnings produced by this catastrophe and establish new and 
improved ways of adequately preparing for the seemingly inevitable and unforeseeable. 
Emergency managers of NYC should likewise learn the lessons from this disaster and 
recognize the possibility of the unimaginable occurring at home. 
Failures: 
 Failure of communities to heed tsunami warnings in many cases 
 Failure to build tsunami walls to protect against a “worst-case” tsunami 
threat 
 Poor education and planning regarding earthquakes/tsunamis in some 
cities (particularly among the elderly and very young) 
 Rescuer fatalities 
 Casualties resulting from poor follow-up after the initial disaster  
 Failure of proper government oversight of safety at Fukushima Daiichi 
 Breakdown of communication between government and nuclear facility 
personnel 
 Lack of timely, accurate communication regarding the radioactive threat 
Successes: 
 Rolling blackouts to ensure continuation of service 
 Internet redundancy 
 Government response to the initial disaster 
 Extensive private industry assistance 
 Use of public broadcasting to disseminate information regarding the 
disaster 




D. CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND EARTHQUAKE—FEBRUARY 22, 
2011 
Christchurch, New Zealand is a coastal, populated city that experienced a strong 
earthquake subsequently identified as the second worst disaster in New Zealand’s history. 
This case study offers overwhelmingly positive aspects of modern-day response 
capabilities following the aftermath of a seismic event. Both the government and its 
citizens provided orderly, systematic assistance in the form of resources, economic aid 
and personnel. Out of all of the scenarios described herein, the strategies employed 
following this large disaster are a model for any city facing a potential black swan. 
Although smaller in magnitude than New Zealand’s previous quake in 2010, the 
Christchurch Earthquake was actually more damaging as the epicenter was located closer 
to the population. It was also closer to the surface, measuring just three miles 
underground (the 2010 quake was approximately six miles deep) and many buildings in 
the affected area had already been weakened from previous quakes.142143 Further 
complicating the hazard, the earthquake occurred during lunchtime on a busy weekday. 
Liquefaction caused the upwelling of more than 180,000 tons of silt resulting in 
significant ground movement that undermined foundations and destroyed 
infrastructure.144  It has been stated that damage caused by the Christchurch quake “may 
be the greatest ever recorded anywhere in a modern city.”145  
According to one seismic engineer, the force of the earthquake was “statistically 
unlikely” to occur more than once in 1000 years, with intensity greater than many 
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modern buildings were designed to withstand.146 In Christchurch, New Zealand’s 
stringent building codes limited the effects of the quake, but even that was not enough to 
protect its citizens. New Zealand building codes required a building with a 50 year life-
span to withstand predicted loads of a 500 year event.147 Unfortunately, initial reports 
suggested a ground motion exceeded that associated with 2500 year design motions.148 
There were over 180 deaths attributed to this earthquake with most due to the collapse of 
structures, or parts of structures, following the quake. Roughly half of the fatalities 
occurred in the Canterbury Television building alone.149 Fatalities occurred across the 
city, including the surrounding suburbs, with some of the recovered bodies unidentified 
due to the nature of sustained injuries. A series of aftershocks followed the M 6.1 
Canterbury earthquake causing further damage and liquefaction in already weakened 
areas, with one M 5.2 quake striking the Christchurch region three months after the initial 
event, further cutting power and causing damage to already weakened buildings in the 
city center.150 
Many challenges were encountered following the quake. Extensive road and 
bridge damage hampered rescue efforts. Soil liquefaction and surface flooding forced 
dramatic road upheavals, spewing water and sand. Cars were crushed by debris and buses 
destroyed by fallen buildings. Eight people were killed when masonry collapsed onto Red 
Bus number 702 on Colombo Street.151 As the earthquake struck around lunchtime, some 
victims on open pavements were buried by collapsed buildings. It was also estimated that 
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80% of the water and sewer system was severely damaged with authorities not only 
urging residents to conserve water, but even to collect rainwater.152 Additionally, by 5 pm 
on the day of the quake, approximately 80% of the city had no power. Fortunately, 
forward thinking and various forms of preparation reduced the impact of this devastating 
quake. Damage occurred in a majority of buildings; particularly those with unreinforced 
masonry, built before local earthquakes codes were introduced. Newer buildings, such as 
skyscrapers built within the past twenty to thirty years, performed well compared to older 
buildings http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-
Cumming5-155#cite_note-Cumming5-155. Christchurch Hospital, though partially 
evacuated due to damage, remained open throughout the aftermath to treat the injured.153 
A State of Emergency Level 3 was declared, the highest possible in a regional 
disaster for New Zealand. Fortunately, the most severe shaking lasted only about  
12 seconds, limiting, to some extent, the damage http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-HERA-38#cite_note-HERA-38.154 The last 
survivor was pulled from the rubble the day after the quake though rescue efforts 
continued for over a week.155 Of the 3,000 buildings inspected within the center of the 
city after the initial response, 45% had been given red or yellow stickers to restrict access 
because of safety concerns http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - 
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cite_note-117#cite_note-117.156 In the end, one thousand buildings within the city were 
slated for demolition because of damage sustained.157 
The Christchurch earthquake is an example of an effective response. Naturally,  
in the immediate moments following the quake, rescue efforts were performed by  
ordinary citizens as well as on-duty emergency service personnel. Many hours passed 
before a full assessment of the devastation could be realized, yet a full emergency 
management structure was in place within two hours, with national coordination  
operated from the National Crisis Management Center bunker in the Beehive in 
Wellington http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-
48#cite_note-48.158 Additionally, a regional emergency operations command was 
established in the Christchurch Art Gallery, a modern earthquake-resistant building that 
had sustained only minor damage.159  
As per established protocols in New Zealand’s Coordinated Incident Management 
System, the Civil Defense Agency took the role of lead agency, supported by New 
Zealand’s police, fire service and other necessary agencies and organizations 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-52#cite_note-
52.160 New Zealand’s Defense Forces were called in to assist evacuation as 
Christchurch’s police force was strengthened by a number of international police forces, 
including approximately 300 Australian police sworn in on their arrival 
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59.161 Police duties included general security, evacuations, search and rescue support, 
traffic control and looting prevention. The police force was also beneficial in providing 
forensic analysis and evidence gathering for victim identification, working closely with 
pathologists, forensic scientists and coroners http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-Police2M-60#cite_note-Police2M-60. They 
were aided by Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams from Australia, the UK, 
Thailand, Taiwan and Israel http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake 
- cite_note-Police2M-60#cite_note-Police2M-60.162 Following international best 
practices after disasters, investigations were detailed and thorough, allowing for an 
organized system of identification and notification.  
Search and rescue after the disaster was accomplished by New Zealand’s  
fire service along with international USAR teams from New Zealand, Australia,  
the UK, the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, China and Singapore. USAR team members  
totaled about 150 personnel from New Zealand and 429 from overseas 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-Stone-
53#cite_note-Stone-53.163 Firefighters responded to fires, damaged buildings and 
landslides and operations were effectively conducted in collaboration with structural 
engineers, seismologists, geologists, construction workers, crane operators and 
demolition experts. The U.S. sent USAR California Task Force 2, a 74-member rescue 
team consisting of rescuers, doctors, engineers and over 25 tons of pre-packaged rescue  
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equipment.164,165 Triage stations were set up and a coordinated medical response was 
established quickly following the earthquake. The Canterbury District Health Board 
coordinated health and medical support across the city, cancelling elective surgery and 
outpatient procedures, and moving existing patients from crowded hospitals to other 
centers. The board successfully managed infection control following the quake, an area 
often overlooked in the aftermath of a large disaster. To put this issue into perspective it 
should be noted that following the Port-au-Prince, Haiti earthquake, a 7-month study by 
an Israeli-based primary healthcare clinic in Leogane found that 43% of persons 
presented with an infectious disease, most commonly respiratory tract infections, sexually 
transmitted diseases and soft tissue infections.166 Additionally, almost two years after the 
quake in Haiti, more than half a million people became ill with cholera resulting in more 
than 7,000 deaths.167 
In New Zealand, primary care facilities, general practice offices and even 
pharmacies were managed to ensure city-wide medical coverage. Additionally, evacuees 
from damaged elderly institutions and disabled-care facilities were relocated to other 
regions. The initial medical care providers were supported by medical staff from areas 
throughout New Zealand and within a few days, an Australian field hospital providing  
75 beds was brought in.168 The field hospital was set up to treat those injured in the 
eastern suburbs and was equipped to provide triage, general practice, emergency care, 
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maternity and even dentistry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake 
- cite_note-93#cite_note-93.  Additionally, Australia sent counselors and a disaster 
medical assistance team comprised of emergency and surgical personnel 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-92#cite_note-92 . 
Fundraising and volunteer centers were established throughout the country, with 
individuals and community groups providing food and services to Christchurch for 
welfare and clean up. This was a major contributing factor in restoring quality of life and 
day-to-day services in a timely manner. The volunteer effort was properly controlled and 
coordinated, with notable results including the removal of thousands of tons of 
liquefaction silt http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-
101#cite_note-101.  A multitude of businesses and organizations contributed to  
the rescue, recovery and repair of damaged infrastructure following the  
quake. Christchurch’s electric distribution lines company, Orion, was assisted by  
other lines companies in New Zealand in the timely restoration of power.  
As 66 kV underground transmission cables supplying substations were  
damaged beyond repair, a temporary 66 kV overhead line was set up. Taking  
six or seven weeks to do so under normal conditions, this emergency line  
was completed in less than three days http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-95#cite_note-95.169 Power was restored to 
82% of households within five days http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-96#cite_note-96, and to 95% within two 
weeks.170 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-
Mathewson-97#cite_note-Mathewson-97.171 A number of emergency generators were 
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donated and telephone companies established emergency communications and allowed 
free calls. Private companies used milk tankers to bring in fresh water while  
contractors were working on water supply lines and the military provided desalination 
plants as bottled water was donated by volunteers and companies. Within one week  
water mains again supplied up to 70% of households http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-98#cite_note-98.172 Emergency latrines were 
set up to compensate for damaged sewage lines and over 2000 portable toilets from 
throughout New Zealand and overseas were brought in  http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-Mathewson-97#cite_note-Mathewson-
97.173 Community laundries were established and portable shower units utilized in 
affected suburbs http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-
Mathewson-97#cite_note-Mathewson-97. A number of private companies also  
assisted with transport, particularly Air New Zealand, who operated extra flights to move 
people and supplies into and out of Christchurch http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/2011_Christchurch_earthquake - cite_note-100#cite_note-100.174  
With proper leadership, a firm commitment to community, a well-thought-out 
strategy, and the generosity of a number of private and public organizations, the citizens 
of Christchurch recovered from this devastating event safely and quickly. This response 
is truly a model to be emulated by communities following any major disaster. An 
experienced international USAR team member who participated in the rescue effort 
described the Christchurch earthquake response as “the best-organized emergency” he 
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 No major failures identified 
Successes: 
 Stringent Building Codes  
 Hospitals operational despite damage (resiliency) 
 Medical care expertly managed (cancelling elective surgery and 
outpatients, moving existing patients, & prompt infection control) 
 Field hospital utilized for suburbs 
 System utilizing red/yellow stickers to assess damaged structures 
 State of Emergency Level 3 declared 
 National coordination 
 International best practices followed 
 Emergency management structure was in place quickly (within two hours) 
 Lead agency designated expeditiously 
 Swearing-in of police officers from neighboring countries to keep the 
peace 
 Designated command centers (command was established in the 
Christchurch Art Gallery, a modern earthquake-proofed building) 
 Infrastructure quickly repaired (emergency line was completed in less than 
three days) 
 Volunteer & business organization aid (widespread effort on many private 
companies and volunteers from all over New Zealand) 
E. LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE—OCTOBER 17, 1989 
Although occurring nearly 25 years ago, much can be learned from an analysis of 
the Loma Prieta earthquake. With a large population, multiple modes of transportation 
and similar methods of emergency response to what exists in New York, a review of the 
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successes and failures of the response following the quake offers insight into problems 
that may occur in a sprawling urban center such as NYC. 
The Loma Prieta earthquake struck the San Francisco Bay Area of California on 
October 17, 1989, at 5:04 pm and lasted 10–15 seconds.176 The epicenter of the quake, 
named after nearby Loma Prieta Peak, was located in an unpopulated area of the Santa 
Cruz Mountains. Caused by a slip along the San Andreas Fault, the quake measured M 
6.9, and killed 63, injured 3,757 and left thousands of people homeless.177 Approximately 
12,000 homes and 2,600 businesses were damaged with many structures not bolted to 
their foundations left dislodged.178 Counties as far away as Monterey were affected and 
unreinforced masonry buildings in Salinas were partially destroyed. Concerned residents 
slept outside of their homes out of fear of aftershocks. There were 51 aftershocks with 
magnitudes higher than M 3 in the following 24 hours, and 16 more the second day 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-
HistoricEarthquakes-32#cite_note-HistoricEarthquakes-32.179 Deemed the largest 
earthquake to occur on the San Andreas Fault since the great 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake, the Loma Prieta earthquake resulted in an estimated $6 billion 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-
SanAndreasFault-0#cite_note-SanAndreasFault-0 in property damage, becoming one of 
the most expensive natural disasters in U.S. history at the time.180  
When the earthquake struck, the third game of the 1989 World Series baseball 
championship was just beginning. Since both participating teams (the San Francisco 
Giants and Oakland Athletics) were based in the affected area, many people left work 
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early or stayed late to attend viewings and parties. Luckily, this resulted in unusually light 
traffic. In fact, initial media reports estimated the death toll to be around 300, failing to 
realize the World Series’ effect on travel; that number was eventually changed to 63 
some days after the quake http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - 
cite_note-12#cite_note-12.181 
The Loma Prieta earthquake caused severe damage throughout much of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, damaging structures built on unstable soil in both San Francisco and 
Oakland. Much of the devastation resulted from liquefaction of soil used to create 
waterfront land. Other damaging effects included sand volcanoes and landslides. Oakland 
City Hall was evacuated and extensive property damage occurred in San Francisco’s 
Marina District, 60 miles from the epicenter.182 This district, built on filled land made of 
materials containing a high percentage of groundwater, suffered significant liquefaction 
causing the earthquake’s vertical shock waves to ripple the ground more severely 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFMuseum-
7#cite_note-SFMuseum-7. It was estimated that 57 deaths were directly caused by the 
earthquake with six fatalities ruled to have been caused indirectly 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-ProfMort-
1#cite_note-ProfMort-1.183  
Surprisingly, it was not the collapse of homes or businesses that resulted in the 
most casualties. The largest number of fatalities, 42 in total, were the result of the failure 
of the Cypress Street Viaduct on Interstate 880 where the top portion of a double-deck 
freeway collapsed, crushing the cars beneath. This stretch of Interstate 880 was partially 
built on filled marshland in the 1950s and when the earthquake struck, vibrations were 
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http://www.oaklandnet.com/celebrate/Historytimeline.htm. (Retrieved August 6, 2012). 
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amplified and soil liquefaction occurred http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-HistoricEarthquakes-32#cite_note-
HistoricEarthquakes-32.184 A 50-foot section of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge 
also collapsed, causing one death and traffic on both decks to come to a standstill. As 
police rushed to clear traffic, rerouting drivers back the way they had come, 
miscommunication by emergency workers at Yerba Buena Island caused drivers to be 
directed the wrong way towards the upper deck of the collapse site.185 One unfortunate 
driver actually plunged over the edge and into the collapsed roadbed killing the driver 
and seriously injuring a passenger.186 Other notable fatalities included five deaths that 
resulted from a brick wall collapse on Bluxome Street in San Francisco 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFGate1999-
3#cite_note-SFGate1999-3.187 In Santa Cruz, close to the epicenter, half of the six people 
killed in the quake died on Pacific Avenue and 29 buildings were destroyed along with 
206 businesses, practically half of downtown.188 Streets, sidewalks and the city’s 
century-old water and sewer system below had been ripped apart.189 
Structural collapse was not the only danger, however. At least 27 fires broke out 
across the San Francisco area, including a major blaze in the Marina District where 
                                                 
184 “Historic Earthquakes.” http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/events/1989_10_18.php/. 
(Retrieved August 14, 2012). 
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apartment buildings sank into a lagoon filled with bay mud.190 At the intersection of 
Beach and Divisadero Streets, a natural gas main ruptured causing a major structure fire, 
and the failure of the hydrant system exacerbated the problem.191 The severely taxed fire 
department resorted to having bystanders help stretch hose lines long distances as nearby 
hydrants were inoperable. Eventually, these long stretches paid off, and with local 
fireboats pumping water to engines on shore, effective extinguishment was accomplished. 
Parts of San Francisco are now equipped with a level of resiliency in their water supply, 
however, this system has yet to be tested under actual earthquake conditions. 
The rescue effort was swift following the earthquake. Civilians immediately 
began to attempt to free victims from the rubble of Ford’s Department Store and the 
Santa Cruz Coffee Roasting Company  http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFGate2004-14#cite_note-SFGate2004-
14.192 Beach lifeguards assisted in search and rescue of damaged buildings in Santa Cruz 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SantaCruz271-
27#cite_note-SantaCruz271-27.193 During the quake, Interstate 880 buckled and twisted 
to its limits before the support columns failed, sending the upper deck crashing to the 
lower deck below and killing 41 people in their cars. Cars on the upper deck were tossed 
around violently with some flipping, injuring a number of drivers and passengers. Nearby 
residents and factory workers quickly initiated rescue using ladders and forklifts 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-Magnuson5-
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10#cite_note-Magnuson5-10 to pull victims out of mangled vehicles.194 Members of 
Oakland’s Public Works Agency also left a nearby city yard to offer assistance 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-Fowler-
36#cite_note-Fowler-36.  Further away from the collapsed roadway police assisted in 
searches of affected areas and police dogs were effectively utilized 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SantaCruz271-
27#cite_note-SantaCruz271-27. Widespread search operations were organized with teams 
of dogs and their handlers at work to scour buildings for victims 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFMuseum1989-
29#cite_note-SFMuseum1989-29. Initially helpful, many civilian volunteers soon became 
a hindrance to professional fire and police rescuers. Those who refused to stop searching 
were eventually arrested, becoming a sour political issue in the days following 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFMuseum1989-
29#cite_note-SFMuseum1989-29.195 Private donations poured in to aid relief  
efforts and a $3.45 billion earthquake relief package was signed by the  
president, ultimately funding the recovery operation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFMuseum-7#cite_note-SFMuseum-7.196 
Transportation problems were handled particularly well following the disaster. 
Immediately following the earthquake, San Francisco Bay Area airports closed for 
damage assessment. Massive cracks in the runway and taxiway of Oakland’s major 
airport, along with damage to the dike used to protect the runway from flooding with bay 
water, required some restricted operations yet all three major area airports reopened the 
next morning.197 Electric power was out to most Santa Cruz customers and many areas 
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were left with no water. Limited phone services were operable, however, providing a 
crucial link to rescue workers. Fortunately the cellular telephone system serving Santa 
Cruz remained operational throughout and after the earthquake and was an important 
communications link for the fire department http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFMuseum1989-29#cite_note-
SFMuseum1989-29.198 San Francisco Municipal Railway lost all power when the quake 
hit, but otherwise suffered little damage and no injuries were reported.199 Cable cars and 
electric trains and buses were stalled and diesel buses had to be relied on for limited 
service until power was restored later that night.200 After 78 hours, 96% of San 
Francisco’s Municipal Railway services were back in operation, including cable cars 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-Muni-
55#cite_note-Muni-55.201 The Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) rail system was virtually 
undamaged and only closed for safety inspection following the quake. As the quickest 
way into San Francisco via Oakland for a month due to the damage sustained by bridges, 
ridership dramatically increased and BART instituted round-the-clock service until 
December 3, when the system returned to a normal schedule 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - cite_note-SFMuseum-
7#cite_note-SFMuseum-7.202 Ferry service between San Francisco and Oakland,  
which ended decades before, was revived during the closure of the Bay Bridge  
as an alternative form of transportation and a ferry terminal was established as the  
Army Corps of Engineers dredged a suitable ferry dock at the Berkeley Marina 
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Overall, it could be reasonably stated that the response to the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake was positive. The death toll was low in comparison to quakes in other 
populated areas of the world. Numerous challenges were overcome and difficulties were 
resolved in various creative ways. Rescue efforts were well organized for the most part 
and normalcy returned to the Bay Area’s population quickly, given the circumstances. 
Emergency managers handled the crisis with efficiency and precision and the actions of 
the involved agencies should be praised. 
Failures: 
 Improper handling of traffic (resulting in at least one preventable death) 
 Lack of resiliency in San Francisco’s water supply for firefighting 
 Failure to instruct and control volunteers 
 Failure of transportation infrastructure in a known earthquake-prone 
location 
Successes: 
 Multiple agencies working well together (FD, PD, lifeguards, public 
works) 
 Creative ways of using bay water for fire extinguishment in some areas 
 Organized search efforts 
 Public transportation systems expeditiously restored 
 Cell phones provided a level of communication resiliency 
F. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION 
A number of similar themes materialize among these disasters in different parts of 
the world. For one, building construction, code and regulation play a major role as a 
passive form of protection. A more dynamic form of protection, however, reveals itself as 
these case studies show that the more prepared a city is, the better the outcome for its 
inhabitants. Obviously, due to the current political, economic and cultural climate in 
NYC some forms of preparedness are more reasonable than others. Emergency managers 
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must carefully sift through the lessons learned in these case studies and choose which 
would better serve the public and which would receive opposition. Building a protective 
sea-wall in NYC, as exists in many parts of Japan, for example, would not be 
economically or socially feasible; however, establishing a system to ensure structural 
engineers assess pre-designated locations following an earthquake deserves serious 
consideration. 
As a result of the previous case studies, emergency managers of NYC have a 
number of things to consider in planning for a high-risk, low-frequency seismic event 
which will undoubtedly occur sometime in the future. All of these considerations can be 
accomplished by high-ranking emergency managers without the need for monetary 
grants, federal aid or costly training; all of which would be difficult to secure in the 
current economic climate coupled with the low frequency of NYC’s earthquake hazard. 
Currently, the FDNY does not have a strategy for responding to an earthquake. 
Some established response policies are applicable to expected disasters resulting from an 
earthquake but the wide-spread devastation likely to result from a moderate or severe 
quake deserves planning and exercise. Some FDNY tactics that can be used under the 
overall earthquake pre-plan “umbrella” include drafting, collapse operations, high-angle 
rescue, medical care, hazardous materials mitigation and decontaminations and of course, 
fire suppression. As the NYC agency with the fastest response time, it is crucial that the 
FDNY establish an overall strategy to manage an earthquake response. Current response 
strategies are in place for dealing with hurricanes, radioactive threats, riots, vessels in 
distress and even aviation accidents; this begs the questions: why not earthquakes?  
The 2003 NYCEM study suggests that approximately 900 fires would result in the 
Tristate area following a M 6, putting fire departments under severe strain. Compare that 
to Hurricane Sandy in October, 2012, which resulted in a total of 21 serious fires, 
destroying more than 200 homes and businesses across NYC.204 One of these fires 
destroyed more than a hundred homes in Breezy Point, Queens. Another 73 structural 
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fires were deemed to be storm-related. In total, 68 fires were electrical, 20 were caused 
by an open flame, such as a candle or stove top, and 6 were sparked by generators.205 
Prior to the storm, FDNY Commissioner Salvatore Cassano deployed an additional 500 
members and more than two dozen rigs to the most vulnerable areas along the city’s 
coast.206 With so many emergency calls during the hurricane, the number of available 
units, which usually hovers around 90%, plummeted to a mere 9% at the storm’s 
peak.207 There is no doubt that FDNY resources were seriously strained during this 
hurricane, even though reserve units were placed in service to deal with the surge in calls. 
Current Citywide Incident Management (CIMS) Policies for natural disasters 
have a number of agencies designated as “primary agencies” (command agencies) under 
the broad term of “natural disasters.”208 Natural disasters need to be broken down into 
different incident types and specific agencies designated in command for each separate 
disaster. This is important as incident command roles may change depending on 
emergencies caused by a particular disaster. In the case of an earthquake, anticipated 
extensive structural collapse and fire involvement would require greater involvement and 
command by the FDNY, whereas the NYPD, in charge of water and ice rescue, would 
have a lesser role in command and implementation of earthquake response. It is 
recommended that under “Earthquakes,” the primary agency designation be modified to 
include agencies such as the Department of Buildings (DOB) and Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP), while other agencies, such as Department of 
Information Technology and Telecommunications (DOITT), Verizon, and various transit 
agencies should be added to “subject matter experts.” Table 6 portrays the current CIMS 
protocol. 
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Table 6.   NYC CIMS Primary Agencies and Subject Matter Experts. (From: FDNY 
Manuals, AUC 276). 
INCIDENT TYPE  PRIMARY AGENCIES 
POTENTIAL PRIMARY 
AGENCIES 
  SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT  
Aviation Incident  FDNY, NYPD  NTSB, PANYNJ, USCG  
CBRN/Haz-Mat 
(no  FDNY, NYPD  DEP, DOHMH, USGC  
suspected terrorism 
or crime)  
  
Public Health  DOHMH, FDNY, NYPD  HHC, GNYHA  
Emergency    
Explosion  FDNY, NYPD  DDC, DOB, HPD  
Natural 
Disaster/Weather  
DOT, DSNY, FDNY, 
NYPD, OEM  
DDC, DEP, DOB, DOHMH, Con Ed, 
Keyspan, LIPA  
Rail Incident  FDNY, NYPD  Amtrack, MTA, NJT, PANYNJ  
Electrical  FDNY, NYPD  Con Ed, Keyspan, LIPA  
Gas  FDNY, NYPD  Con Ed, Keyspan, LIPA  
Steam  FDNY, NYPD  Con Ed  
Water  DEP, FDNY, NYPD  Con Ed, Keyspan, LIPA  
Telecommunication  DOITT, FDNY, NYPD  Verizon  
 
The FDNY also lacks the current positive working relationships with private 
businesses, volunteer organizations and even the military, as was the case in the 
successful case studies. As earthquakes are low frequency events in NYC, there are no 
current pre-planned areas for command or mustering of FDNY members. Additionally, 
current tactics do not take into account the limited number of available resources that can 
be expected following an earthquake. The large number of units dedicated to a single 
civilian trapped in a trench cave-in, as per present FDNY SOP’s, will not be available for 




Emergency supplies on hand must also receive consideration following a seismic 
event. To meet anticipated needs during a category 3 or 4 hurricane, OEM has developed 
a comprehensive Coastal Storm Plan that includes detailed procedures for evacuating and 
sheltering residents. The City’s shelter system consists of 65 evacuation centers and up to 
509 hurricane shelters, including eight special medical needs shelters.209 To supply and 
staff the shelter system, OEM maintains an emergency stockpile of essential supplies and 
a database of nearly 25,000 City employees who would be called upon to manage 
evacuation centers and emergency shelters.210 The FDNY also has a plan identified as 
“BIOPOD,” which calls for the assembly of multiple points-of-distribution of vaccines 
and medicines for members, which can also be implemented following a large 
earthquake.211 The stability of these shelters and availability and adequacy of supplies 
and medicine following an earthquake must be examined to ensure they would meet the 
needs of evacuees and victims following a large-scale earthquake. 
Levels of resiliency, such as use of helicopters to access obstructed areas and 
setting up field hospitals to care for the injured, are not currently part of the FDNY’s 
operational procedure. Additionally, there is no priority for locations of fire suppression 
should the FDNY’s resources become overwhelmed and no strategy to account for the 
difficulty of utilizing existing recall procedures in the face of widespread devastation and 
interrupted modes of transportation. Finally, the FDNY needs to discuss the legal 
consequences of certain decisions and attain the rights to implement emergency 
procedures in the face of impending disaster. By reviewing these case studies, the FDNY 
can avoid mistakes made by foreign response agencies.  
The successful strategies implemented by New Zealand during the Christchurch 
earthquake of 2011 underscore the importance of an effective pre-plan. The other case 
studies portray failures in the emergency response even though these countries are 
                                                 
209 “NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Conducts Hurricane Drill,”  OEM. (June 2, 
2008). http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/news/08_02_06_hurrex2008.shtml. 
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211 New York City Fire Department. “FDNY Manual Fire Tactics and Procedures, Emergency 
Response Procedures Addendum 1 Chapter 2.” (August 2004). 
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located in high-impact seismic zones. The leaders of the FDNY must first recognize the 
seismic threat to NYC and then formulate a strategy to deal with this threat. In order to 
start the FDNY on the road to success, a number of recommendations are made that will 
emulate the successes of these case studies while avoiding failures. By focusing on the 
positive aspects of responses to previous earthquakes, the FDNY can modify these 
successful strategies and tailor them to the vast and complex City of New York. 
Recommendations 
NYC Pre-plan Considerations / Lessons to be learned:   
1. Plan for quick, efficient aid from local, military and international experts. 
2. Explore the possibility of setting up a temporary field hospital.   
3. Explore the possibility of utilizing open waterways for medical ocean vessels, 
military ships and boats distributing large amounts of resources. Also consider 
the feasibility of commandeering existing commercial vessels for emergency 
transportation and use. 
4. Explore the possibility of using local helicopters for survey and to bypass 
damaged roads. 
5. Pre-plan open, wide areas, with unimpeded access routes for mustering of 
emergency responders. 
6. Plan for extensive, city-wide resource management such as distributed food 
and water. 
7. Review procedures for declaring a “state of emergency” early, when the need 
is evident. 
8. Evaluate special hazards city-wide (chemical plants, areas with extensive 
excavation work, Indian Point.) 
9. Analyze the potential of using local, undamaged medical clinics for 
emergency treatment as well as trained medical professionals. 
10. Establish rapport with private companies (including infrastructure and utility 
companies) to ensure emergency resource allocation, transportation and 
infrastructure repair can be quickly accomplished.  
11. Maintain points-of-contact with infrastructure supervisors to ensure the timely 
isolation of gas, power, electric and water when necessary. Ensure resilient 
means of communicating with these individuals. 
12. Establish a method whereby structural engineers can ensure a quick survey of 




13. Identify procedures to assess the integrity of damaged buildings and the use of 
easily-identifiable methods (numbers, letters, colors,) to assign hazard levels 
post-disaster. 
14. Follow international best practices for earthquake response. 
15. Pre-plan for a designated Lead Agency.   
16. Identify and pre-determine possible command centers (strong, resilient 
structures.)   
17. Identify areas and buildings with back-up generators. 
18. Pre-plan additional dependable water sources for fire suppression. 
19. Contact Volunteer & Business organizations (and possibly include them in 
tabletop exercises.) 
20. Evaluate the feasibility of establishing curfews.  
21. Discuss law enforcement options for force protection and review existing 
procedures. 
22. Brainstorm the possibility of increasing penalties for crimes during “states of 
emergency.” 
23. Plan to stockpile anticipated emergency supplies and medicine specific for an 
earthquake response.  
24. Plan for the possibility of a tsunami and its associated hazards should one 





IV. ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITIES 
In this section, the city’s vulnerabilities are exposed with each borough of NYC 
given a priority hazard assessment score based on the author’s professional opinion using 
known facts and other data to estimate preferential allocation of the FDNY’s limited 
resources following a major earthquake. In most cases each borough will be given a score 
of 1 through 5, with 1 being the lowest hazard score for the particular vulnerability, and 5 
being the highest. In cases where only one or two boroughs can be identified as having a 
particular vulnerability, that borough/s will receive a higher score while all others will 
share the same lower score. The same will be done in any case where a particular 
borough has a significant advantage over others in regard to a particular vulnerability; 
that borough will have the lowest priority hazard score with others sharing the higher 
mark. These scores are based on a combination of available data and a professional 




Figure 6.   Boroughs of NYC. (From: Date: July 12, 2009. User: PerryPlanet.  
File: New York City District Map.svg. 
http://wikitravel.org/shared/File:New_York_City_District_Map.png). 
NYC is mainly a city of islands. Because of this, damage caused by an earthquake 
has the potential to isolate these islands, along with first responders. It is crucial for 
FDNY Borough Commanders to ensure strategies are formulated with this in mind. The 
immediate aftermath of an earthquake is likely to be the most crucial period in regards to 
saving lives and mitigating emergencies. Each borough must initially operate with the 
limited resources on hand until the true extent of the city-wide crisis becomes realized. 
After the initial immediate response, available resources will need to be allocated to areas 
of need. It is the intent of this section to identify areas of need based on available data 
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and professional experience so that a proper pre-plan can be developed. It must be 
stressed here, however, that resource allocation among the five boroughs may be delayed 
due to the structural vulnerability of bridges, roads and tunnels between these boroughs. 
Procedures must be put in place that will ensure the safety of emergency responders in 
traversing these access points following a seismic event. One option is to have 
established Department of Buildings (DOB) rapid assessment teams automatically 
dispatched to pre-designated bridges, roads and tunnels ensuring they are safe prior to 
FDNY use. The feasibility of ensuring DOB timely response, however, must be explored. 
At the very least, policies can be implemented ordering FDNY units to standby at the 
entrance of these critical points until a knowledgeable chief officer arrives on scene and 
assesses their potential for collapse. As emergency response progresses, it is anticipated 
that resources may be allocated and hazardous areas prioritized as real-time critical 
information becomes available allowing agency leaders to make sound decisions 
regarding mitigation. With these plans in place and proper strategies implemented, it is 
envisioned that control of the entire city would gradually be regained using a continually 
evolving Incident Action Plan (IAP) based on a thorough analysis of the disaster.  
Survival for as long as fourteen days has been documented in earthquakes around 
the world. However, the survival rate percentage has its greatest decline just one day after 
the occurrence.212 Even with the chaos of on-going fire and emergency activity, within 
24 hours FDNY members should have an estimate of which collapsed structures in their 
area could have potential survivors. These areas must be immediately made known to the 
Fire Department Operations Command (FDOC) and areas throughout the city prioritized. 
With priorities established, buildings deemed most hazardous can be searched by Urban 
Search and Rescue (USAR), followed by specially trained FDNY Special Operations 
Command (SOC) units and finally, Operations-Level trained Engine and Ladder 
                                                 




Companies searching buildings presenting the least hazard to personnel.213 In any case, a 
long-term goal would be to have every damaged structure searched, at the latest, within 
fourteen days following the earthquake. As emergency managers increase control of the 
situation in the days following the quake and damaged buildings are both identified and 
prioritized, by using NYC agencies, volunteers, and even national and global aid, 
fourteen days is a realistic goal following a large earthquake.  
Table 7.   Time of Extrication vs. Survival Rate. (From: FFP Collapse 11.7.1). 
Time of Extrication Survival Rate 
30 minutes 99.3% 
1 day 81% 
2 days 36.7% 
3 days 33.7% 
4 days 19% 
5 days 7.4% 
 
A. POPULATION 
The population of NYC is widespread and varied. A 2011 census revealed NYC’s 
landmass to be over 47,000 square miles, entailing approximately 411 people per square 
mile.214 Measured against the national average of just over 87 people per square mile, 
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one can see that NYC is heavily populated.215 13.7% of the population is 65 years of age 
or older and 22% are under 18 years of age (with 6% being under 5 years).216 
Additionally, 21.7% are foreign-born, living and working in NYC.217 The number of 
people living or working within the five boroughs of NYC is truly a challenge to first 
responders in the event of a black swan. Evacuations, victim-tracking and incident 
command are likely to be confusing and overwhelming. Current emergency management 
methods will have to be expanded and improvised in order to account for missing and 
trapped victims, as well as ensure a “risk versus reward” approach is taken under 
dangerous conditions. Figure 7 reveals a breakdown of NYC’s population by borough: 
 
 
Figure 7.   NYC’s Population by Borough 2010–2012. (From: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml).218 
                                                 




218 It should be noted here that this hazard assessment is based purely on population, which could be 
related to casualties. However, it is the combination of a number of complex factors, including population, 
infrastructure and time of day, which will determine the hazard.   
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Based on population number, a potential hazard assessment has been assigned as 
follows:  
 Manhattan: Potential Hazard Score 3 
 Bronx: Potential Hazard Score 2 
 Brooklyn: Potential Hazard Score 5 
 Queens: Potential Hazard Score 4 
 Staten Island: Potential Hazard Score 1 
B. SUBWAY SYSTEM 
Handling over 4.5 million passengers daily, NYC’s subway system is among the 
busiest urban transit systems in the world and with 6,200 cars servicing 25 lines, it is 
arguably one of the most complex.219 The subway system services NYC’s boroughs 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, making civilians susceptible at any time an earthquake may 
strike. The potential for complex rescues must also be considered with two-thirds of the 
660 mile working track system located underground, and the remainder elevated or at 
grade level.220 The potential for casualties is great in NYC’s complex transportations 
system. Underground portions of the subway may collapse while other portions flood. 
Train derailments are likely and passengers may be trapped in unfamiliar, dark and 
smoky confined spaces without power. The absence of power is certainly preferable in 
some instances as self-evacuating passengers face a greater degree of danger if 
unknowingly stepping near an energized third rail. Lack of service underground will 
surely delay emergency calls for assistance from deep tunnels. Portions of elevated train 
tracks may also collapse, raining debris onto vehicles and pedestrians on the streets 
below. Each borough has its own unique challenges relating to NYC’s subway system.221 
 Manhattan: 2011 estimated annual ridership of 904,762,522. 118 stations. 
Hosts the lowest station at 180 ft below street level at 191St.222 Also hosts 
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the busiest, and arguably most complex, station in the subway system at 
42nd St and 8th Ave in Times Square.223 As of 2011, out of the top ten 
busiest subway stations in NYC, nine are located in Manhattan.224 
Potential Hazard Score: 5 
 Bronx: 2011 estimated annual ridership of 142,957,026. 68 stations. 
Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Brooklyn: 2011 estimated annual ridership of 352,296,972. 157 stations. 
Hosts the highest station at Smith / 9th Street. Potential Hazard Score: 4 
 Queens: 2011 estimated annual ridership of 240,626,516. 78 stations. 
Potential Hazard Score: 3 
 Staten Island: 2008 estimated annual ridership of 5,593,828. 22 stations. 
Hosts only grade-level tracks, most likely requiring less complex rescues 
post-quake.225 Potential Hazard Score: 1  
Even an earthquake of small magnitude causing little to no damage throughout the 
subway system would require an overwhelming response of FDNY resources. As one of 
NYC’s largest consumers of electricity, each year the transit system consumes some 1.8 
billion kilowatt hours of power.226 A loss of this power could result in widespread panic 
and resultant need for orderly evacuation and medical care. Perhaps most importantly, 
power should remain off if impatient or fearful victims unwilling to wait for 
overwhelmed FDNY responders decide to self-evacuate. Evacuating along catwalks or at 
track level exposes unwary civilians to third rails and catenary wires, both extremely 
dangerous should power abruptly be restored. It is crucial that contact be maintained with 
the appropriate Desk Superintendent at the Transit Control Center, utilizing existing 
Department procedures, to ensure power is not abruptly restored. In the event Department 
radio traffic prevents proper notification to ensure power remains off, members should 
use “blue light” telephones or transit workers (supervisors, operators and conductors) to 
relay the current situation and need for power to remain off. A separate system of power 
provides station lighting, tunnel lighting, signals and ventilation equipment in the tunnel 
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and consideration should be given to loss of this power as well, further inducing panic 
among those self-evacuating under dangerous conditions.  
Due to increased training, safety equipment, and system-wide resilience, the 
potential for train collisions would not be greatly increased during an earthquake 
however, derailment and structural collapse is still a very strong possibility. Additionally, 
the problem of flooding remains a danger. Each day pumps remove up to 13 million 
gallons of rain and other water from the subway system.227 This water is ultimately 
dispersed into NYC’s storm-water system but debris blocking drains along the tracks 
coupled with an overwhelming volume of water could lead to disastrous flooding in 
many tunnels. Under-river tubes present their own problems as the tubes themselves may 
leak creating a flooding condition compounded by the electric hazard of the 3rd rail and 
overhead power lines.  
In the event of an earthquake, serious consideration should be given to having 
NYC Transit Authority (NYCTA) personnel direct the majority of victims of stopped or 
lightly damaged trains to safety with FDNY operations reserved for major derailments, 
collapse and transport of non-ambulatory victims. The use of diesel-powered trains on 
intact transit lines to move personnel and equipment until power is restored should also 
be explored, although failure of natural and mechanical ventilation within tunnels can 
result in diesel fumes becoming detrimental to both responders and evacuees. In any case, 
NYCTA has 62 diesel-electric locomotives capable of pulling non-powered flat cars and 
crane cars and the benefits of their use should be explored.228 The FDNY and NYCTA 
require a closer relationship in planning for natural disasters and direct lines of 
communication and pre-planning will be necessary to ensure the safety of all transit 
customers.  
                                                 






NYC’s power grid is one of the largest systems of electricity delivery in the world 
with daily consumption of approximately 11,000 megawatts during summer months, 
slightly more than in the entire country of Chile.229 This is due, in part, to the city’s 
heavy reliance on urban necessities such as the subway system, traffic signals and 
elevators. High-voltage power is delivered from a number of different generating plants 
and is stepped down by some 33,000 transformers and distributed through the world’s 
largest underground electric cable system.230 Access to over 80,000 miles of underground 
electric cable is provided by 250,000 manholes throughout the city.231 NYC itself is 
responsible for roughly one-tenth of all electric power used within the city.232 It is 
important to note here that most of the city’s power is generated from within the five 
boroughs, with four generating plants in Queens alone accounting for roughly half of the 
energy output in the city.233 Central generating plants are assisted by smaller generators 
to meet peak demands and electricity generated within the city is supplemented with 
power created outside of the five boroughs. The Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant 
produces up to 20% of the city’s demand with additional generating stations located in 
New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and upstate NY.234  
An earthquake with an epicenter far from NYC may have consequences for 
NYC’s power distribution, however, a quake in or around NYC is likely to be much 
                                                 
229 Solar One, “Electricity in NYC.” (2008). 
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worse, affecting the majority of power distribution. Even with reliance on generating 
plants far from the city, transmission and distribution lines may be damaged or disrupted 
following a powerful earthquake, negating any potential resiliency from outside the city 
regardless of how much power is increased. The serious potential for power disruption 
will increase with the magnitude of the earthquake; however, even less-powerful quakes 
have the potential of causing significant damage. Although Con Edison plays a major role 
in the electricity transmission business, in 1999 the corporation sold many of its electric 
generating plants to NRG Energy, Keyspan, and U.S. Power Generating Company; a fact 
to consider when attempting to build positive relationships as part of the planning for 
numerous utility emergencies likely after a quake.235 
Although NYC’s power grid has often been considered to be one of the most 
reliable in the world, the simplicity in which it can fail has been proven three times:236  
 1965 Blackout: Caused by a transmission line failure in Ontario. 
 1977 Blackout: A thunderstorm took down power lines north of the city.237 
 2003 Blackout: Power failures as far away as Ohio triggered shutdowns affecting 
much of the eastern seaboard. 
In all of these scenarios, it took hours to restore power to parts of the system. It 
can be anticipated that a moderate to severe earthquake in NYC may result in weeks for 
even a partial restoration of power.  
Following a moderate or severe earthquake, the utility distribution network 
located in underground manholes, prevalent in Manhattan and present in other boroughs, 
will most likely become inoperable and may result in widespread fire damage extending 
into buildings as well as generating toxic fumes within structures, most notably carbon 
monoxide, a deadly, insidious gas that is undetectable without special instrumentation. 
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Repair of NYC’s underground electric distribution network will be timely. High-voltage 
cables, should they need repair, can take up to 12 hours to splice together.238 
Overhead power lines found in all boroughs of NYC except Manhattan could be 
toppled, cutting power to residents, starting fires and electrocuting unlucky or unwary 
civilians. Additionally, these toppled poles and wires, even when confirmed de-energized 
and grounded, are likely to cause widespread hindrance of roads and thus, even capable 
emergency responders. Underground service may not cause immediate hindrance to first 
responders but will be significantly harder to repair over the long term. With all factors 
taken into consideration, priority hazard scores are given to each borough based on the 
immediacy of the threat posed by electrical emergencies. As widespread power outages 
are to be expected, the most significant threat aside from electrocution would be fire, 
explosion and carbon monoxide/other deadly gas generation. This threat is significantly 
greater and much more difficult to mitigate when underground and so, higher scores are 
given to boroughs with total or significant electric service located underground. 
 Manhattan: All electrical service located underground. 21,216 miles of 
underground cable and 60,026 manholes and service boxes. Potential 
Hazard Score: 5  
 Bronx: Electrical service above ground and below ground. 10,901 miles of 
underground cable, 29,668 manholes and service boxes and 2,679 miles of 
overhead wire on 18,023 utility poles. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Brooklyn: Electrical service above ground and below ground. 27,317 
miles of underground cable, 76,697 manholes and 3,552 miles of overhead 
wire on 26,288 utility poles. Potential Hazard Score: 4 
 Queens: Electrical service above ground and below ground. 24,795 miles 
of underground cable, 80,921 manholes and service boxes and 6,995 miles 
of overhead wire on 39,670 utility poles. Potential Hazard Score: 3 
 Staten Island: Electrical service above ground and below ground. 2,748 
miles of underground cable, 5,654 manholes and service boxes  and 5,019 
miles of overhead wire on 29,422 utility poles. Potential Hazard Score: 
1239 
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One important power source that should be taken into consideration for 
emergency use following an earthquake is NYC’s fleet of power barges located primarily 
in Gowanus Bay and at Sunset Park along the Brooklyn waterfront.240 Usually used to 
supplement power during peak demand, these power barges can serve as an emergency or 
temporary power source (barring any potential water damage following an earthquake). 
The Gowanus site, with 32 combustion units, is the world’s largest floating power 
plant.241 Emergency generators located throughout a number of NYC firehouses can also 
serve to provide electricity for a short period of time, powering tools and communication 
devices as long as these units, and the adjoining firehouse, are not damaged during or 
after the quake.  
2. Steam 
NYC’s subterranean steam network is the biggest steam system in the world. 
Generated from seven plants across the city, steam flows up to 75 mph through over 100 
miles of mains and service pipes, located under 1,200 manholes.242 There are five steam 
generating plants located in Manhattan, with one in Brooklyn, and one in Queens.243 
Steam mains may be anywhere from four to 15 feet below ground and steam pipes can be 
several feet in diameter (the most common being between two and three feet).244 Mostly 
made of steel, older cast-iron pipes are still used for steam distribution and are vulnerable 
to cracking. Often coated with asbestos, these steam pipes can result in a haz-mat 
situation at the most inopportune time. Maintained by Con Edison, steam demand peaks 
during the coldest months of the year. Approximately 100,000 homes and businesses, 
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including the Empire State Building, rely on NYC’s steam system. Additionally, local 
area hospitals make regular use of steam, mostly for sterilization.245  
In NYC, the two most concentrated areas of steam distribution, and consequently 
where some of NYC’s buildings are tallest, are in lower Manhattan and midtown 
Manhattan. In July 2007, a 24” steam pipe located underground in Manhattan exploded 
causing widespread damage, panic, injuries and one death.246 An earthquake could cause 
a number of these incidents, spreading already limited FDNY resources thin and 
releasing asbestos into the air contaminating civilians and responders. 
 Manhattan: Greatest concentration of steam distribution. Steam generating 
plants. Potential Hazard Score: 3 
 Bronx: No steam distribution. Potential Hazard Score: 1 
 Brooklyn: Steam generating plant. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Queens: Steam generating plant. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Staten Island: No steam distribution. Potential Hazard Score: 1 
3. Water 
This subject is particularly important aside from disruption of available drinking 
water and damaged caused by flooding and leaking pipes. The disruption of water supply 
to NYC presents extreme challenges to the FDNY following an event where resultant 
structural fires are almost a certainty. Without a steady, reliable water supply, fires may 
go unchecked, consuming and destroying much of NYC. And so, restoration of this 
utility may very well be as important, or even more important, than electricity. The NYC 
water system relies on 18 collecting water reservoirs, some as far as 125 miles north of 
the city, as well as two storage reservoirs and four distributing reservoirs.247 Three 
aqueducts are used to move water from the upstate reservoirs to NYC citizens. 
Constructed at different times and having different shapes, NYC residents depend on 
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each for an uninterrupted flow of water. Perhaps the most well known is the New Croton 
Aqueduct, constructed between 1885 and 1890, running from the Croton Reservoir 
System to Jerome Park Reservoir, located in the Bronx.248 With substantial cracks 
already throughout the various aqueducts, resulting in a loss of an estimated 36 million 
gallons of water each day, a moderate earthquake can be the catalyst that effectively stops 
the flow of fresh water into the city’s millions of residents.249  
Two large water tunnels distribute water throughout the five boroughs, with a 
third currently under construction, designated to be completed by 2020.250 Water Tunnel 
No. 1, completed in 1917, stretches 18 miles from the Bronx into Manhattan, and 
ultimately into Brooklyn.251 Covered by at least 150 ft of rock in most places, the tunnel 
is 200 to 300 feet deep and carries 500 to 600 million gallons of water each day.252 One 
can clearly see that repairs to this tunnel, should extensive damage occur, will be no easy 
task. Water Tunnel No. 2 was active in 1936 and runs from the Bronx into Queens, and 
ultimately connects to the five mile long Richmond tunnel, supplying water to Staten 
Island.253 Distribution of water to city residents is almost entirely dependent on gravity. 
About 3% to 5% of city water requires additional pressure to reach end users with 
pumping stations located in Washington Heights in north Manhattan, Douglaston in 
eastern Queens, and Grimes/Todt Hill on Staten Island.254 Power loss to one or all of 
these pumping stations can cause a loss of pressure in certain areas of the city. With an 
intricate mix of underground service lines, distribution mains, regulators and 
approximately 118,000 fire hydrants throughout the city, there is potential for serious 
water loss due to ground shaking caused by an earthquake.  
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About half of NYC’s water distribution system was built before 1930 and consists 
of unlined, cast-iron pipes, with the remaining half subsequently built stronger to reduce 
susceptibility to corrosion and failure.255 The municipal water system as a whole is 
designed to ensure hydrant pressures of 45 to 60 psi and anything less can seriously 
hamper firefighting.256 For water shortage (drought) emergencies, the city does have the 
ability to draw from river water as well as neighboring water systems. Additionally, 
certain supply lines are interconnected with lines serving central New Jersey and 
Philadelphia.257  
It is important to point out the dangers associated with water storage systems 
throughout the five boroughs when affected by an earthquake. With an estimated 10,000 
to 15,000 water towers (most often conical shaped, rooftop wooden tanks) throughout 
NYC, the potential for a few of these to collapse onto the roof, or off of the roof in some 
cases, must not be overlooked.258 Additionally, even in the best-case scenario where 
water supply and pressure is not affected by a seismic event, attention must be given to 
the possibility of water treatment plants being compromised. DEP samples NYC’s water 
through compliance sites and surveillance sites as well as monitors supplementary 
groundwater systems serving the city. A strong relationship between the FDNY and DEP 
must ensure open lines of communication to protect the health of NYC’s citizens and first 
responders should these systems be compromised.259 
 Manhattan: Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Bronx: Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Brooklyn: Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Queens: Potential Hazard Score: 2 
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 Staten Island: The Silver Lake storage tanks (two 50-million-gallon tanks) 
locate 20ft below ground, ensures a two-day supply of water is kept on 
hand.260 Potential Hazard Score: 1 
4. Sewer 
With over 6,600 miles of sewer pipes, approximately 100 pumping stations, and 
14 wastewater treatment plants, NYC processes an astonishing 1.3 billion gallons of 
sewage every day.261 These pipes range from 6 inches to more than 89 inches in diameter 
and are generally buried more than 10 feet underground, below the level of clean water 
pipes.262 Installed at various points in NYC’s history and constructed from a number of 
different materials, these pipes may fail during an earthquake and depending on the 
magnitude and amount of ground movement, even gravity may not prevent the mixing of 
raw sewage with clean drinking water. The city’s complex sewer system is not the only 
problem as some homes among the outer boroughs still rely on septic tanks. Although 
these tanks may be damaged during an earthquake, the fact that they are isolated systems 
lessens the chances of the greater NYC water supply becoming contaminated, and so, 
greater attention can be paid to the widespread NYC sewage system.  
When wastewater treatment plants are unable to handle a large amount of sewage 
(a common occurrence during heavy rainfall) excess flow is diverted into a combined 
sewer overflow outfall and discharged into the harbor untreated.263 Should an earthquake 
damage or disrupt NYC’s wastewater treatment system, the potential for large amounts of 
sewage dumping out into the harbor and contaminating NYC’s waterways is great and 
may have far-reaching effects. The 2003 Northeast blackout alone resulted in over 400 
million gallons of raw sewage being dumped into NYC’s waterways.264 This must be 
considered following a quake where water mains are disrupted and FDNY Engine 
Companies must resort to drafting from natural waterways for adequate water supply 
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when fighting fires. The hazard priority assessment below takes into account the number 
and capacity of their sewage treatment areas and plants in each of NYC’s boroughs.265 
 Manhattan: Two treatment centers totaling 420 million gallons a day. 
Potential Hazard Score: 4 
 Brooklyn: Five treatment centers totaling 675 million gallons a day. 
Potential Hazard Score: 5 
 Bronx: One treatment center totaling 200 million gallons a day. Potential 
Hazard Score: 2 
 Queens: Four treatment centers totaling 375 million gallons a day. 
Potential Hazard Score: 3 
 Staten Island: Two treatment centers totaling 100 million gallons a day. 
Potential Hazard Score: 1 
5. Gas 
Con Edison serves Manhattan, the Bronx and north Queens, while Keyspan 
supplies gas to Brooklyn, Staten Island, and south Queens. Fortunately, with the 
exception of very limited amounts of liquefied natural gas held at power plants in the 
city, natural gas is not stored in the city.266 As gas is distributed by a large network of 
underground piping, the potential for extreme gas emergencies exists following an 
earthquake. Although plastic and steel pipes are used to replace damaged piping today, 
previously used cast iron pipes, brittle and aged, are still prevalent. With shut-off valves 
and bypass valves throughout the system, gas mains are generally at least three feet 
underground and fully susceptible to ground movement. Structural and underground gas 
leaks are a common response for FDNY units under normal, ideal conditions. In fact, the 
number of serious natural gas pipeline incidents in New York City shot up dramatically 
in 2011, increasing by 400 % compared to the previous year.267 
                                                 
265 Priority is based on the number of capacity of sewage treated in each borough, not the number of 
facilities. Although it can be assumed that the more facilities a borough has the more resilient the system. 
Ascher, K. “Anatomy of a City.” New York, NY: Penguin Books USA, 2007, 178. 
266 K. Ascher, “Anatomy of a City.” New York, NY: Penguin Books USA, 2007, 113. 
267 “Natural Gas Pipeline Incidents in NY Soared in 2011, Led By Alarming Increase in NYC Pipeline 
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Damaged underground piping will result from a moderate quake causing 
regulators and relief valves to fail, and permitting explosive amounts of natural gas to 
buildup both underground and in buildings. Gas lines will rupture in the street, as well as 
within structures, starting numerous fires that may become uncontrollable due to 
emergency responder limitations following this disaster. FDNY private sector points-of-
contact (Con Ed and National Grid) must be able to be reached following an earthquake 
to ensure timely control and isolation of gas mains. Established procedures for electrical 
emergencies whereby FDNY Battalion Chiefs are able contact Con Ed Control Center or 
Substation Shift Managers directly via Department-issued cell phones should be 
expanded to include Con Ed Gas and National Grid Gas Services.268 Additionally, 
secondary and tertiary means of communication should be established in the event cell 
phone service is disrupted. Established Department Radio channels, Handie-talkies, land-
lines, or 800 MHz radios are all viable options, and their expected resiliency during a 
seismic event should be explored. As all natural gas distributed within the five boroughs 
is provided by Con Edison or National Grid, and presents the same hazards, the potential 
hazard scores are as follows: 
 Manhattan: Potential Hazard Score: 3  
 Bronx: Potential Hazard Score: 3  
 Brooklyn: Potential Hazard Score: 3   
 Queens: Potential Hazard Score: 3  
 Staten Island: Potential Hazard Score: 3 
6. Pipelines  
Pipelines in and around NYC carrying gasoline, aviation fuel and natural gas may 
also rupture, overwhelming first responders. Pipeline provider Buckeye Partners MLP 
operates two 12” diameter steel pipes, one carrying gasoline and the other carrying 
kerosene-based aviation fuel, that traverse underground portions of Brooklyn, Queens 
and Staten Island.269 The pipeline operates at 1,200 psig at Linden, New Jersey with 
                                                 
268 New York City Fire Department. “FDNY Manual All Unit Circular 340,” (June 2008). 
269 Ibid., 2. 
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maximum service pressure on terminal piping and delivery lines up to 200 psig.270 The 
Iroquois pipeline is located throughout portions of the Bronx and carries natural gas 
through a 24” diameter high pressure steel pipe.271 This pipeline is operated by Con 
Edison and has a maximum allowable operating pressure of 1,440 psig, though it will 
typically operate between 400 and 1,100 psig.272 All of these pipelines have safety valves 
and metering stations. More importantly, the FDNY has detailed procedures and semi-
annual drills on how to handle an emergency in one of the sections of these pipelines. 
Unfortunately, following an earthquake a number of pipeline sections may fail resulting 
in numerous conflagrations or at the very least, hazardous material leaks.  
With FDNY resources already spread thin, standard operating procedures for 
handling these emergencies will have to be amended to allow expeditious control. 
Improving the relationship between the FDNY and pipeline providers while exploring 
capabilities of a system-wide shut-down, or at the very least, extensive isolation, should 
be considered. 
 Manhattan: No pipelines traverse Manhattan. Potential Hazard Score: 1 
 Bronx: Iroquois Pipeline. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Brooklyn: Buckeye Pipeline. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Queens: Buckeye Pipeline. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
 Staten Island: Buckeye Pipeline. Potential Hazard Score: 2 
D. BRIDGES/TUNNELS  
There are 14 major bridge and tunnel crossings connecting the various parts of 
NYC to each other and to neighboring jurisdictions.273 Living and working in one of the 
most populated cultural, financial and political centers in the world, the citizens and 
emergency responders of NYC rely on key components of the city’s transportation 
infrastructure for day-to-day activities. One critical component of this infrastructure is the 
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vast network of bridges and tunnels that connect NYC’s boroughs. Each borough faces its 
own challenges and problems in the event ground transportation becomes limited. Taking 
into account building configuration, population density, traffic conditions and potential 
isolation from adjacent jurisdictions and cities, the borough of Manhattan is by far the 
most vulnerable.  
Four major vehicular tunnels connect Manhattan as well as six major bridges. 
Some are under the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) jurisdiction while others are 
operated by different agencies like the Port Authority, NYC Department of Parks & 
Recreation and Amtrak.274 In assessing the principles of risk, competitive exclusion, self-
organized criticality, tragedy of the commons and the paradox of enrichment, it can be 
determined that the primary threat for this level of infrastructure is natural hazards; most 
notably, an earthquake. 
A 2003 study in the Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities examined 
over 500 bridge collapses in the U. S. and found that the average age of the failed 
structure was 52.5 years.275 As of 2008, NYC had three bridges rated “poor” after their 
last inspections, meaning components of the bridges needed rehabilitation, not that they 
were unsafe.276 A single bridge or tunnel labeled unsafe and prohibited from use, even 
for emergency personnel, is not likely to seriously affect the FDNY’s operational 
capacity; however, multiple avenues of ground transportation likely to be damaged 
following an earthquake may severely limit logistics, resource management and 
operations within the FDNY. A moderate or severe earthquake simultaneously destroying 
portions of the city’s bridges and tunnels is the biggest threat facing NYC. Indeed, a 
powerful earthquake may collapse sections of both bridges and tunnels, negating their use 
as well as causing widespread flooding. Due to the lack of frequency of earthquakes in 
the NYC area, the city’s transportation infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to this 
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threat. The simultaneous destruction of a great majority of NYC’s bridges and tunnels, or 
at the very least a period of time negating their use, can pose extreme problems for the 
FDNY.  
Each bridge has its own unique design, from suspension bridges to trestle bridges, 
to steel arch bridges. Many are movable bridges including retractile bridges, vertical lift 
bridges and bascule bridges (drawbridges). Some bridges are very complex, such as the 
Williamsburg Bridge with eight traffic lanes, two transit tracks and a pedestrian walkway. 
Tunnels likewise vary in design and length. Materials surrounding the tunnel consist of 
cast-iron, concrete, or varying composite materials. The number of traffic lanes, as well 
as emergency exits and ventilation towers, differ throughout these complex modes of 
transportation. NYC’s tunnels all traverse bodies of water and consist of varying designs 
of air supply and exhaust systems that must be taken into account should portions of a 
tunnel collapse during seismic activity. Additionally, various degrees of water flooding 
and leakage should be taken into account as well as the potential for installed pumps to be 
overwhelmed. Each bridge and tunnel requires its own analysis and response plan in the 
event of a disastrous earthquake.  
In the event a large-magnitude quake occurs, it will be crucial for the FDNY to 
have a system to replace its exhausted members, transport equipment and ensure the 
availability of much-needed resources to the “islands” of NYC which will likely be 
inundated with emergency and fire calls related to the natural disaster itself. In the initial 
stages of the disaster, FDNY members recalled can be ordered to firehouses closest to 
their residence and make use of available equipment to begin operations. The downside 
to this is the unbalanced distribution of the majority of “blue-collar” firefighters 
responding in the outer boroughs, closer to home, leaving Manhattan with the fewest 
number of members able to report for duty by vehicle or on foot. As FDNY leadership 
collaborates and formulates an IAP, a more balanced distribution of resources can be 
allocated based on where the need is greatest. The vast network of waterways in and 
around NYC can be the FDNY’s greatest asset. The use of fireboats as well as 
commandeering other vessels (ferries, water taxis, sightseeing vessels) to transport 
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members and equipment would be invaluable as part of a well-developed strategic 
operating plan. The possibility of transporting fire apparatus by vehicle-carrying 
ferryboats should be considered, with the various ports of NYC serving as staging areas 
for the FDNY.  
A large disaster cutting off all ground transportation into and out of the various 
boroughs of NYC does not have to result in a logistical nightmare leaving the FDNY 
without capabilities. By thinking “outside the box” and using available resources, the 
FDNY can ensure an effective response to even the most unlikely black swan. In the 
initial stages, when the stability of bridges and tunnels are suspect, Manhattan and Staten 
Island emergency response will be limited to the resources contained within these 
respected boroughs. Utilization of fire boats and commandeering other vessels for 
transportation of personnel is an option during the initial stages. After a structural 
engineer is able to confirm the safety of bridges and/or tunnels, units and personnel can 
be routed via these points to where they are needed. It is also recommended that 
procedures be established to ensure the automatic dispatch of a rapid-assessment team 
from DOB to pre-designated bridges, roads and tunnels identified as particularly 
vulnerable to a seismic event. Establishing a pre-plan with DOB officials identifying the 
importance of each access point and prioritizing the order of inspection of these bridges 
and tunnels post-disaster is necessary to ensure quick and effective emergency response. 
Also essential is the use of NYPD personnel to keep bridges and tunnels clear of all 
traffic with the exception of emergency and other permitted vehicles during the initial 
stages following a quake. The priority hazard assessment below takes into account each 
borough’s reliance on NYC’s bridge and tunnel network including individual bridge and 
tunnel vulnerability.277 
 Manhattan: The oldest crossing, Highbridge, connects Manhattan to the 
Bronx over the Harlem River. The Queensboro Bridge is the busiest East 
River crossing. The Brooklyn Bridge is the oldest and busiest of the lower 
Manhattan bridge crossings into Brooklyn. The Holland Tunnel is the 
oldest vehicular tunnel in the region. The Lincoln tunnel consists of three 
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tubes with lanes varying direction depending on the time of day (i.e., rush 
hour). Potential Hazard Score: 5 
 Bronx: The elevated tracks near Yankee Stadium are part of the longest 
railroad-owned bridge. The George Washington Bridge’s 14 lanes make it 
one of the world’s busiest suspension bridges.278 Potential Hazard Score: 
3 
 Brooklyn: The longest municipally owned bridge is the Gowanus. The 
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel is the longest continuous underwater vehicular 
tunnel in the world. Potential Hazard Score: 4 
 Queens: The Queens Midtown Tunnel permits traffic to and from 
Manhattan and accommodates thousands of vehicles a day. Potential 
Hazard Score: 2 
 Staten Island: The Bayonne Bridge is one of the longest steel arch bridges 
in the world with a mid-span clearance of 151 ft.279 Potential Hazard 
Score: 4 
E. BUILDINGS 
As of July, 2012, NYC is home to the second highest number of skyscrapers (over 
500), more than any other city in the world except Hong Kong.280 It is also home to five 
of the top twenty tallest buildings in North America. Following an earthquake, the 
emergencies faced by first responders are varied and in large, complex buildings may 
include dealing with panic, mass evacuations, hazardous materials situations, stalled 
elevators, suspended scaffolds and loose or fallen debris. To compound the problem, 
older buildings without emergency power, or where emergency power has failed, will 
complicate rescues as firefighters may have to climb over 50 flights of stairs to extinguish 
a fire or remove occupants from a single trapped elevator. 
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Much of the island of Manhattan sits on a deep layer of soft, post-Ice Age 
sediment over extremely hard rock, “a juxtaposition of geological extremes.”281 Further 
analysis of NYC’s geology and soil composition, particularly areas where liquefaction is 
likely to occur, is certainly warranted. Regrettably, various earthquake-mitigating 
requirements applied to NYC building codes were absent until the mid-1990s, however, a 
basic analysis reveals that generally, well-designed towers in the city’s skyline would 
most likely survive an M 6 quake. Unfortunately, unreinforced masonry townhouses, 
where most residents live, might not.282 As shown in Figure 8, 79% of buildings in 
Manhattan alone are constructed of unreinforced masonry, a true hazard for victims and 
rescuers in the event of an earthquake.283 
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Figure 8.   Building Types of NYC by Neighborhood. (From: 
http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oem/mitigation/archive/documents/S3.I.vi_Earthquake_
Hazard_Profile.pdf). 
The worst-case-scenario in the event of an earthquake would be a total collapse of 
major portions of high-rises, requiring extensive search efforts, specialized units and 
numerous resources. Adequate victim-tracking will be mandatory and thorough searches 
necessary. Large buildings would require timely searches and sidewalks may have to be 
closed off to the civilian population if loose or unrestrained objects are a concern. 
Although the exact number of high-rise structures per borough is not able to be obtained, 
Manhattan invariably has the greatest number of skyscrapers with Staten Island having 
the least. Potential hazard scores are assigned with this in mind, also accounting for the 
total number of buildings in each borough.284 
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 Manhattan: 41,500 buildings. Majority of high-rises in NYC (over 75 ft 
high). Potential Hazard Score: 5 
 Bronx: 80,888 buildings. A few high-rises (over 75 ft high). Potential 
Hazard Score: 3 
 Brooklyn: 271,052 buildings. A number of high-rises (over 75 ft high). 
Potential Hazard Score: 4 
 Queens: 224,528 buildings. A number of high-rises (over 75 ft high). 
Potential Hazard Score: 4 
 Staten Island: 108,975 buildings. Very few high-rises (over 75 ft high). 
Potential Hazard Score: 1 
F. COMMUNICATIONS 
Resiliency in communications is essential for any first responder and with 
equipment reserves, back-up generators and a number of tested ways to effectively 
communicate in various circumstances, the FDNY is one of the most prepared 
organizations in the world. The residents of NYC, however, may not be. Surprisingly, an 
estimated 20% of the city’s citizens do not have regular phone service in their homes.285 
Yet, residents dial 911 an average of 23 times each minute, close to 12 million times each 
year.286 Police, fire and EMS rely heavily on NYC’s communications system for 
response and incident command. Modern communication systems are complex, 
consisting of many components including copper wire, coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, 
carrier hotels, and switching stations, to name a few.  
There are approximately 80 switching stations spread out across the five boroughs 
with each containing a complex array of computer-controlled digital and fiber optic 
equipment as well as supplementary power, cooling and ventilation systems.287 Some of 
this equipment is so sensitive that many of these switching stations are windowless; the 
absence of glass panes protect telephone switches and sensitive electronic equipment 
from dust, temperature and humidity.288  
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Having the largest cellular market in America, there are approximately 10.5 
million cell-phone subscribers in NYC.289 The system is frequently subject to overload, 
with calls commonly dropped during peak hours. In 2002, an estimated 120,000 calls to 
911 did not go through due to cell-phone failure.290 Many high-rise buildings of NYC 
frequently obstruct cell signals under normal conditions. Following an earthquake where 
parapet walls crumble and roofs collapse, it can be expected that a number of cell phone 
towers will be inoperable and a system-wide shutdown of cell phone communications 
anticipated. According to NYC’s Department of Information Technology and 
Telecommunications (DOITT) the mobile telecommunications franchise allows cell 
phone providers to install and use telecommunications equipment and facilities, including 
telecommunications boxes and antennae, on public street-light poles, traffic-light poles 
and utility poles to provide mobile telecommunications services in all five boroughs.291 
The resiliency of the structures on which crucial telecommunications equipment is 
installed during an earthquake is questionable. As the telecommunications network is 
generally reflective of the number of users, the loss of communications are liable to affect 
all boroughs equally. Likewise, the fact that equipment generally does not pose a 
significant threat to the general public, the following potential hazard scores are provided 
equally to each borough as shown below. 
 Manhattan: Potential Hazard Score:1  
 Bronx: Potential Hazard Score: 1 
 Brooklyn: Potential Hazard Score: 1 
 Queens: Potential Hazard Score: 1  
 Staten Island: Potential Hazard Score: 1 
G. SPECIAL PROJECTS 
At any given time there are a number of complex projects underway throughout 
the five boroughs of NYC. Special consideration must be given to these sites as they will 
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each present their own unique hazards, vulnerabilities and personnel accountability. 
Presently, there are two major construction projects within NYC. The first is the 
construction of NYC Water Tunnel No. 3, the largest capital construction project in 
NYC’s history.292 With an estimated total length of 60 miles, construction began in 1970 
and will not be complete until 2020, at a cost of nearly $6 billion dollars.293 The tunnel 
traverses and connects all five boroughs and runs from 800 feet below ground at its 
deepest, to approximately 400 feet below ground at its shallowest.294 For the purposes of 
NYC’s earthquake analysis, it is important to note that the Manhattan section of the 
tunnel is currently being worked on and scheduled to be activated in 2013.295 
Previously excavated using “drill and blast” techniques, the 10 to 24 foot diameter 
tunnel is presently being hollowed out through use of Tunnel Boring Machines.296 It is 
anticipated all future construction of the water tunnel will utilize this technology and 
FDNY first responders will have to familiarize themselves with complicated rescues that 
may result from even a weak earthquake. It must be expected that unstable work areas 
around the tunnel and Tunnel Boring Machines will present challenges regarding shoring, 
rescue and victim transport from locations hundreds of feet down from the surface of 
NYC streets. 
The second project is the construction of the 2nd avenue subway line. A number of 
methods are being used to construct this tunnel underneath the densely-populated east 
side of Manhattan, including utilization of a Tunnel Boring Machine. Other portions will 
be excavated using the “cut and cover” method and mining coupled with “drill and blast.” 
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297 Just like Water Tunnel 3, complex rescue and recovery operations can be expected 
should seismic activity trap or injure workers in or around portions of the tunnel. The 
most recent proposed construction schedule has the 2nd avenue subway open for 
passenger service in 2016.298 
As both of these extensive projects are currently underway in Manhattan, 
potential hazard scores are distributed as indicated below. 
 Manhattan: Potential Hazard Score: 3   
 Bronx: Potential Hazard Score: 1   
 Brooklyn: Potential Hazard Score: 1   
 Queens: Potential Hazard Score: 1  
 Staten Island: Potential Hazard Score: 1 
The data clearly shows that NYC is a complex habitat with a large number of 
vulnerabilities that can result in the loss of time, money and lives in the event of a 
moderate or severe seismic event. By exposing these vulnerabilities and educating 
emergency managers as to the potential hazards first responders may face in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, steps can be taken to prepare NYC response agencies to 
operate safely and efficiently in even the most shocking disaster scenario. 
H. FDNY RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Finally, based on existing data and a professional assessment of the potential 
hazard scores for each of NYC’s vulnerabilities, resource allocation for each borough can 
be estimated prior to a major earthquake. Figure 9 indicates which boroughs will require 
more staffing, equipment, resources and expertise following a devastating earthquake due 
to an analysis of NYC’s major vulnerabilities.  
The data shows Manhattan to be the most vulnerable and the area where the 
largest number of FDNY resources will be required. Manhattan is followed by Brooklyn, 
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Queens, the Bronx and Staten Island, in that order, for risk assessment and resource 
allocation. This is only an estimate with all known factors taken into consideration. As 
always, resource allocation may change on the day of the disaster as potential threats are 
revealed and other mitigating circumstances are made known; however, Figure 9 should 




Figure 9.   Final Hazard Comparison by Borough 




V. RESPONSE OF THE FDNY AND PRE-PLAN 
CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to NYC’s vulnerabilities, there are a number of factors the FDNY 
must consider following the occurrence of a major earthquake. Depending on the extent 
and severity of the quake, these factors may be major considerations requiring the full 
focus and effort of the FDNY or may require little to no attention at all. Regardless, these 
factors must be considered when formulating a pre-plan for an earthquake in or around 
NYC.  
A. FIRES 
One of the most dangerous outcomes following an earthquake is the loss of lives 
and property due to widespread conflagrations. History has shown that uninhibited fires 
can be responsible for wiping out whole districts in vulnerable cities. Aside from the 
destruction caused by tremors during the famous 1906 San Francisco earthquake, it was 
the associated fire that resulted in 80% of the total damage.299 In fact, the two largest 
peace-time urban conflagrations in history were the fires associated with the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake and the fires following the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the latter which 
resulted in the great majority of the estimated 140,000 fatalities.300  
Obviously the fire service has come a long way since the early 1900’s in regards 
to fire science, technology and equipment, but the danger still exists, and may be greater 
than ever with the presence of numerous petroleum-based products and furnishings, large 
pipelines carrying flammable gases and liquids, and the reduction of firefighting staffing 
throughout the country.301 NYC is especially prone to its firefighters becoming 
overwhelmed because of these issues. In fact, 35 fire companies were cut between 1972 
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and 1975 and the 1975 reduction in firefighter staffing levels reduced engines from five 
firefighters per company to four and ladder companies from six firefighters to five.302 In 
2003, six more fire companies were closed and in 2011, all engines were reduced to four 
firefighters.303 All of this occurred in a city where, from 1993 to 2011, structural fires 
remained fairly constant while non-fire and medical emergencies significantly increased; 
and the city’s population continues to grow. As the FDNY operates at the busiest levels 
throughout its history, the challenges firefighters will face following an earthquake will 
have to be met with aggressiveness, determination and quick-thinking. 
In NYC, numerous sources of ignition coupled with obstructed response paths are 
only the beginning of the fire problem following a quake. With water mains damaged 
throughout the city, firefighters will have to rely on other sources of water such as 
booster tanks, water towers in unaffected structures and drafting. Booster tanks will be 
adequate for extinguishing incipient fires and allowing a quick search and rescue of some 
affected structures, however, a more reliable, constant source of water is needed. Large, 
complex structures as well as high-rise buildings equipped with wet standpipe/sprinkler 
systems and water towers may be a source of supply depending on the integrity of these 
systems post-quake. Identifying and utilizing draft sites will be invaluable in FDNY 
efforts to mitigate the numerous expected fires. Intact pools, lakes, ponds, bay and river 
water are all potential positive sources and long stretches of hose lines must be expected. 
Due to the location and nature of these sources, it is recommended that sites without 
close, natural bodies of water be identified and alternate methods of water delivery 
explored.  
Due to widespread collapse of large buildings and infrastructure, fire apparatus 
may not be able to access blocked roads. Possible solutions must be weighed against their 
level of difficulty to carry out. FDNY apparatus are very large vehicles capable of 
moving debris if necessary. Additionally, the FDNY operates a number of smaller 
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vehicles such as Brush Fire Units (BFU), Gator Units, and Rapid Response Vehicles 
(RRV), which can traverse a large variety of territory under a multitude of conditions. 
Forthwith activation of these vehicles, some of which are equipped with winches, water 
supply, and a variety of useful equipment, should be considered in FDNY’s planning. 
The use of helicopters to reach especially isolated areas should also be explored. Calling 
for, and using, the National Guard’s flat-bed trucks to traverse flooded areas for 
firefighting is also a possibility, as successfully proven during the 1997 Grand Forks, 
North Dakota flood.304 As a measure of resiliency, and a method to “cut NYC’s losses,” 
one final recommendation is to prioritize structures involved in, or exposed to, fire in 
order to adequately suppress conflagrations with the limited number of resources 
available following a catastrophic earthquake.  
The brave members of the FDNY will have many challenges to overcome 
following a moderate or severe earthquake in NYC and it will only be through effective 
leadership, critical thinking and bravery that the numerous fires expected will be able to 
be suppressed and the lives and property of the citizens of NYC ultimately saved. 
                                                 






Figure 10.   FDNY Responses 1993–2011. (From: 
http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-165/issue-8/features/fire-
department-performance-management-is-public-policy-on-the-map.html). 
B. INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS 
The Citywide Incident Management System protocol observed by NYC first 
responders is likely to be overridden in the initial stages of the rescue effort. Timely 
command, coordination and effective leadership will be required to gain control of the 
situation post-disaster. As units are most likely to perform duties related to their “core 
competencies” as stated in CIMS, strategic and tactical direction must be conducted with 
this in mind.  
The Fire Department will largely be in control of fire suppression, search and 
evacuation, and technical rescue. NYPD will be in charge of force protection, keeping 
order, and enforcing any emergency rules and regulations in effect. EMT’s, paramedics 
and related individuals in the medical field will take control of patient care and victim 
tracking. DOT and Sanitation would be best utilized in clearing roads for ground 





and tunnels, moving onto buildings needed for immediate use (large areas for temporary 
shelter, hospitals), and then buildings utilized for quality-of-life matters (electric 
substations, water treatment facilities). 
Public-private partnerships will also be necessary as the Port Authority (PA) and 
private airlines arrange for the restoration of air transport, telecommunication providers 
work to restore services and utility companies coordinate with first responders to safely 
mitigate emergencies and quickly restore needed services. All agencies and businesses 
expected to be utilized in the aftermath of a large earthquake should be included in 
various parts of the FDNY’s planning and representatives invited to attend tabletop 
exercises. 
C. LACK OF HELP FROM SURROUNDING JURISDICTIONS 
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, FDNY 
operations were supplemented by firefighting resources from neighboring jurisdictions. It 
was not uncommon to find volunteer fire companies from surrounding areas in NYC 
firehouses on that day, and the days that followed, answering calls. This was necessary as 
a number of the FDNY’s fire apparatus were destroyed and a vast majority of the 
remaining companies deployed to lower Manhattan, leaving fire resources in the rest of 
the city quite scarce. Unfortunately, the same cannot be expected following an earthquake 
of significant magnitude occurring in or around NYC.  
As an earthquake occurring in the northeast region of the U.S. is likely to affect a 
number of large cities due to the underlying geology of the East Coast, assistance from 
surrounding jurisdictions is likely to be minimal, if present at all. Professional and 
volunteer companies are likely to be inundated with calls in their own districts and rescue 
and fire suppression units from farther jurisdictions actually able to offer assistance will 
be challenged with logistical problems such as scattered debris and poor or unsafe road 
conditions in the vicinity of NYC. Assistance from unaffected departments located a 
considerable distance from NYC may be necessary, although the transportation of 
required heavy equipment (hoses, portable fire pumps and aerial or tower ladders) is 
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estimated to take substantially longer than transportation of associated personnel. 
Transporting trained personnel and limited equipment would be feasible by air; however, 
apparatus may only be able to arrive via ship or ferry, a timely process, as rail and road 
conditions are likely to be severely hampered. 
Pre-planning for a moderate or severe earthquake should certainly take into 
account the time it will take for manpower, equipment and expertise to make its way into 
the city. Identifying resilient avenues of transportation and locations for resource 
management ahead of time will likely expedite the flow of aid to NYC in the aftermath of 
the quake. 
D. RIOTS/APOCALYPTIC GROUPS 
Interagency cooperation with the NYPD is essential for crowd control and 
security following a strong earthquake. A devastating quake may result in a variety of 
reactions such as looting and vigilantism to untrained civilians attempting to perform 
rescue work, putting themselves in danger and compounding the problem. Law 
enforcement will face many challenges in dealing with the public following an 
earthquake and should consider prioritizing public safety and force protection in 
preference to rescue work. 
According to Daniel Kruger, a social and evolutionary psychologist at the 
University of Michigan’s School of Public Health, “people may be taking food and 
supplies they need for survival, actions most people would find excusable given the 
circumstances.”305 Mr. Kruger also goes on to state that “if people do take non-
necessities, such as TVs, they’re probably not thinking about right and wrong since these 
uncertain situations can lead to a breakdown of social norms.”306 These people, as well as 
Emotionally Disturbed Persons (EDP), must be handled professionally using necessary 
force, while still recognizing the extreme pressures a natural disaster may impose on an 
                                                 
305 Rachael Rettner, “Post-Disaster Looting: Loose Morals or Survival Instincts?” Live Science 





unsuspecting population. FDNY personnel must recognize the potential for irrational 
behavior following a black swan, while remaining focused on the rescue effort. 
Another problem field units may encounter is terrorist/apocalyptic groups with 
malicious intentions. Following the events of September 11, 2001, anthrax spores sent 
through the mail complicated FDNY operations as the extensive rescue and recovery 
operations at the World Trade Center site, along with the influx of 911 calls regarding 
“strange white powders,” spread FDNY resources thin. Strategies including the activation 
of “Hammer Teams” to handle white-powder calls, which were successful post-
September 11, may have to be implemented again. Terrorist organizations, especially 
apocalyptic groups, whether associated with mainstream religions or not, may take 
advantage of the chaos following an earthquake, especially a devastating low-frequency 
quake in a high-profile location like NYC. Agency leaders pre-planning for this disaster 
should keep this in mind and modify procedures accordingly. 
As far as FDNY units are concerned, All Unit Circular (AUC) 138, an existing 
operational procedure for times of civil disobedience, may need to be activated.307 To 
improve response procedures, it is recommended that NYPD be included in tabletop 
exercises involving the earthquake scenario. The use of armed Fire Marshal’s for force 
protection out in the field is also a consideration. These trained members can ride along 
in Battalion vehicles and be used for security and force protection on the scene of critical 
operations. As successfully executed following the Christchurch, New Zealand quake, 
officers from jurisdictions not affected by the quake and incoming military personnel can 
be sworn in for emergency duty and supplement the NYPD in law enforcement duties. 
E. TRANSPORTATION 
Transportation post-disaster includes not only getting victims out of affected areas 
to medical facilities and temporary shelters, but also consists of getting appropriate 
 
 
                                                 
307 New York City Fire Department, “FDNY Manual All Unit Circular 138,” (June 1988).  
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rescue personnel, resources and supplies into and throughout NYC. All available modes 
of transportation will have to be utilized to the greatest extent possible although some 
will be more limited than others.  
Ground transportation is important, but will be limited depending on the condition 
of roads and presence of debris. Due to the numerous interconnections to the ground and 
reliance on consistent power, it is anticipated use of the local train service, including the 
subway system, will be non-existent. Transportation via air is a possible solution with 
supplies and personnel expeditiously transported to the closest, unaffected airport and 
delivery of limited supplies and real-time surveys accomplished via small aircraft or 
helicopter. Ocean-going vessels are able to serve a variety of purposes such as 
transporting vast amounts of resources and providing medical facilities, although it is 
anticipated the response time of these vessels will be slow comparable to other forms of 
transportation.  
As rescue turns into recovery, additional avenues of access and egress into a 
number of critical NYC areas will open up, improving operations. Until then, however, 
resilient methods of transportation must be planned for and contacts with associated 
agencies or businesses established accordingly. 
F. TEMPORARY SHELTER AND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION 
According to a 1982 UN article, “disasters are not merely acts of God but are 
aggravated by human error and lack of foresight.”308 The UN study highlights principles 
that should be adhered to in preparing victim shelters following a disaster. In summary, 
these principles are listed below.309 
1. Resources of survivors – The primary resource in post-disaster shelter. 
Duplicating actions of survivors should be avoided. 
                                                 
308 “Shelter After Disaster: Guidelines for Assistance,” United Nations. (1982 ). 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E4FE896AFFF16709C1256CB10056558E-undro-
shelter1-jul82.pdf. 2. 





2. Allocation of roles for existing groups – This should be undertaken by local 
authorities best qualified to decide who should do what, when and where.  
3. Assessment of needs – Assessing short-term human needs is more important than 
assessing damage to houses and property.  
4. Evacuation of survivors – Compulsory evacuation can retard recovery and cause 
resentment while voluntary evacuation can be a positive asset. 
5. The role of emergency shelter – Understand the relevance of true emergency 
shelter. 
6. Shelter strategies – The earlier reconstruction begins, the lower the social, 
economic and capital costs. 
7. Contingency Planning (Preparedness) – This can help reduce distress and 
homelessness. 
8. Reconstruction –An opportunity to introduce new building methods and 
regulations to reduce future hazards. 
9. Relocation of settlements – This is rarely feasible except in the case of partial 
relocations within a city or town, which results from recognition of specific 
hazard areas. 
10. Land use and land tenure – Take into account all aspects of land use and 
infrastructure planning. 
11. Financing shelter – Utilizing grants is a short-term solution, however, it is more 
advantageous for the community to participate in the financing of their own 
permanent reconstruction. 
12. Rising expectations – Temporary shelter frequently accelerates the desire for 
permanent, modern housing, well beyond reasonable expectations. 
13. Accountability of donors to recipients of aid – The most effective relief and 
reconstruction policies result from the participation of survivors in determining 
and planning their own needs. 
14. Guidelines for the local level –This should be formulated by qualified, local 
personnel in light of prevailing conditions. 
 
The list above is a comprehensive guide to effective sheltering following a natural 
disaster and the FDNY need not be familiar with all principals. As primarily an 
immediate response agency, the role of the first responder will be to direct victims to 
appropriate shelters and respond to shelters for emergency purposes. Most important, is 
the pre-designation of emergency shelters within and around NYC and FDNY policy-
makers must keep this in mind when planning for an earthquake. NYC has a number of 
structures that may be utilized for sheltering the thousands of evacuees to be expected. 
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Many buildings that have been designated as “fallout shelters” in the past should be 
considered as well as stadiums, arenas and public parks. Of course, all of these structures 
would need an expedited safety inspection performed by experienced DOB personnel 
prior to use. These facilities will also require law enforcement personnel for order and 
protection, as well as volunteers and supplies. The military will be able to assist in both 
of these crucial areas. Climate and weather conditions must be considered as well when 
exploring potential shelters. Should an earthquake occur in the middle of a harsh winter, 
outside areas such as stadiums and parks may not be suitable for victims. Similarly, 
victims will need adequate space and protection from heat during a hot summer.  
Undoubtedly, a major earthquake will cause water pipes and sewer lines to be 
destroyed, undermining adjoining utilities, flooding certain areas, starting electrical fires 
and contaminating NYC’s clean water. Bottled water and rations will be required 
throughout shelters and medical facilities. Additionally, provisions must be made to 
provide necessities such as toiletries, portable showers and toilets, and both over-the-
counter and prescription medications. Law enforcement personnel may be required to 
ensure the equitable distribution of these resources and the FDNY will have to prioritize 
response to both temporary shelters and resource distribution centers post-quake. 
G. COMMUNICATION  
The FDNY is strikingly resilient when it comes to intra-unit communications. 
FDNY members are provided with UHF Handie-talkies, spare batteries, and battery 
charges supplied by individual apparatus and firehouse generators at select locations. 
More problematic, however, is the 911 system. Even if landlines or dispatch offices are 
not damaged by the initial tremors, it is expected the 911 system will be overwhelmed 
with calls from distressed, panicked or trapped civilians. A total breakdown of 
communication should be anticipated and plans for breaking FDNY general response 
areas into sectors considered.  
Worst-case scenarios will call for individual units, member teams or civilian 
volunteers to patrol areas for fires and other emergencies until a reliable “911” system 
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comes back online. Reliance on the armed forces and their military-grade communication 
equipment may have to be resorted to. Cell phone companies may be able to offer limited 
service to select users provided their own facilities are not damaged. Discussions with 
representatives of these companies and an analysis of the resiliency of their networks will 
be necessary. In addition, field-testing of military-grade communication equipment 
deserves consideration. Tabletop exercises should include creative alternatives to current 
vulnerable communication systems. 
H. RECALL 
As the communication systems of NYC are likely to be down in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster, current methods of recalling first responders via phone call, text 
message or even local media could be ineffective. Additional options must be taken into 
consideration including back-up communication systems, radio, unaffected media outlets 
and even social media if possible. It should also be anticipated that many first responders 
will be dealing with their own concerns and family matters, including rescue operations 
in their own communities, within or outside NYC.  
Responders living outside of the five boroughs may find it difficult to travel into 
the city and additional modes of transportation may be required. In any case, it can be 
anticipated that on-duty responders will be working for long periods of time and logistics 
commanders must keep this in mind when setting up resource and rehabilitation centers. 
Working closely with NYPD, access into the city should be initially reserved only for 
emergency responders, law enforcement and medical personnel. Civilians looking for 
loved ones, business owners and good-intentioned volunteers must be publically urged to 
steer clear of the limited access routes into the city. The use of media outlets will be 
crucial in transmitting this information as will be the efforts of the NYPD to allow 
emergency responders access while turning others away. In addition, it is recommended 
that all emergency personnel be advised to carry their official identification with them 
while responding in from home to be granted access to avenues of entry into the city. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
How can the FDNY prepare for a high risk, low frequency seismic event in NYC? 
The answer to this question depends on the unyielding commitment and dedication of the 
FDNY’s senior management. Historical evidence, current data and ongoing research has 
proven that NYC is indeed prone to a moderate or severe earthquake and such an event 
will occur in the future. As is demonstrated time and time again, FDNY senior officers 
are undoubtedly resourceful in planning for the most severe and unlikely potential crises; 
and earthquakes should be no exception. Currently, the FDNY lacks a response strategy 
for an earthquake scenario in or around NYC. The intent of this thesis is not to form 
specific plans for all scenarios, but to alert the leadership of the FDNY to the potential of 
an earthquake striking NYC and entice these knowledgeable and experienced officers to 
factor in this possibility into their awareness and designated response plans for their own 
districts and areas of responsibility. The formation of an exclusive FDNY Response Plan 
for an earthquake scenario with emphasis placed on borough-wide response strategies is a 
necessary first step for preparing the FDNY for an earthquake. Ultimately, the 
recommendations provided after a thorough analysis of the case studies, coupled with the 
recognition of NYC’s vulnerabilities and the potential challenges faced by the FDNY, 
will assist FDNY leaders in preparing for this potential threat. 
Budgeting for such a low probability event would hardly be justifiable. Likewise, 
pursuing grants or other forms of economic aid for this black swan would be futile. 
Instead, pre-planning with the resources the FDNY already has is an effective option. 
Financial aid from the Federal Government, non-profit organizations (NPO) and 
empathetic civilians is likely to flow into NYC following a disastrous earthquake which 
would assist in the recovery. Public Awareness campaigns regarding a specific low 
frequency threat such as an earthquake are not worth undertaking however, as part of an 
overall safety campaign (fire, hurricanes, earthquakes), they may be beneficial.  
The most practical solution for earthquake preparation in NYC is an effective pre-
plan coupled with periodic table-top exercises. FDNY Borough Commanders can 
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perform a hazard analysis of the districts under their command utilizing knowledgeable 
staff and eager subordinates. This hazard assessment will be the foundation whereby 
FDNY leadership will discuss, and ultimately plan for, a potential earthquake scenario. 
The resultant strategies formed can be used in varying degrees depending on the severity 
of the quake. Whether it is an M 6 earthquake occurring hundreds of miles away that 
lightly shakes NYC’s highest structures, or an M 6 with an epicenter in the city itself that 
destroys NYC’s bridges and tunnels, having a plan will increase responder confidence, 
minimize casualties and allow citizens to resume normal activities far quicker than being 
caught off-guard during this black swan. Obviously the low frequency of earthquakes 
affecting NYC does not warrant unnecessary alarm, wasted resources and extensive 
measures. However, the high risk associated with such a potential event demands some 
action on the part of NYC’s first responders. A well-thought-out strategic plan, coupled 
with the knowledge and experience of all of the FDNY’s members, may just result in an 
effective, safe and world-renown response to an event that almost no one could 
anticipate.  
The analysis of the earthquake hazard in NYC coupled with a review of current 
FDNY policies underscores the importance of preparing the FDNY for a major seismic 
event. To do so will require an implementation plan taking into account two crucial 
factors. The first is to utilize existing chain-of-command procedures to gather information 
regarding specific areas and threats in each of NYC’s numerous communities. Local 
Battalion Chiefs can utilize information gathered from units under their command and 
identify specific hazard areas or useful areas (such as open areas and lakes or ponds). 
Higher-ranking Deputy Chiefs will then collate Battalion recommendations and endorse 
as necessary. After offering their professional opinion, this information will ultimately be 
distributed to the Borough Commander of each borough who will review the 
recommendations of Deputy and Battalion Chiefs, edit or add necessary information, and 
discuss the plan with the Chief of Operations, Chief of Department, Fire Commissioner 
and finally, a dedicated focus group.  
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The establishment of a dedicated focus group is the second factor in formulating 
an effective pre-plan for an earthquake in NYC. This group should consist of a variety of 
educated and experienced FDNY members of diverse backgrounds and of different ranks 
within the Department. The goals of this group will be to record and establish a 
preliminary IAP based on information retrieved from group meetings with the agency 
heads (high-ranking chiefs) of the FDNY. This group will also be responsible for 
contacting applicable agencies and organizations for emergency contact numbers and to 
keep them updated of specific goals related to FDNY earthquake preparedness, while 
establishing rapport for future inter-agency considerations. Finally, the focus group will 
organize table-top exercises and include FDNY decision-makers and planners, along with 
related agency and business leaders, in these exercises to test the FDNY’s capabilities in 
an earthquake scenario. As lessons are learned and weaknesses revealed, the plan will be 
modified as necessary.  
Based on the recommendations provided by an analysis of the aforementioned 
case studies, coupled with data relating to NYC’s specific vulnerabilities, the focus group 
should begin formulating an earthquake response strategy with the following actions: 
1. The focus group should establish contact with local military leaders to record 
emergency contact information and establish rapport. 
2. Have FDNY Research & Development (R&D) solicit bids for temporary field 
hospitals that may be set up by EMS Command.  
3. The focus group shall contact the United States Coast Guard (USCG) to 
identify accessible waterways in and around NYC. FDNY lawyers shall 
determine the legality of appropriately commandeering vessels in times of 
crisis as the focus group establishes rapport with local vessel operators to 
determine the most effective way of accomplishing this. 
4. The focus group shall establish emergency contact information with 
individuals in charge of heliports and explore the feasibility of landing in 
different types of local terrain (open fields, waterways). 
5. Have local Battalions recommend open areas, offering unimpeded access 
routes, for mustering of emergency responders. 
6. The focus group shall analyze citywide reserves of food and water and 
establish a plan to distribute these reserves first to emergency responders and 
the sick/injured, and then to the general population. 
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7. The focus group shall contact the OEM to determine procedures for declaring 
a “state of emergency” and brainstorm adjusting these levels under certain 
conditions. 
8. Use the chain-of command to identify “target hazard” buildings and areas as 
well as using existing “pre-incident guideline” (PG) structures, available on 
the FDNY Intranet, to analyze their vulnerability during an earthquake. 
Develop a city-wide strategy for a possible Indian Point nuclear facility 
disaster.  
9. Include hospital staff in table-top exercises and have units identify specific 
local, hardened medical clinics for possible emergency treatment. 
10. The focus group shall establish rapport with private companies, prioritizing 
energy and utility companies, and include these companies in table-top 
exercises. 
11. Ensure points-of-contact are established with supervisors of gas, power, 
water, electric and other utilities, to ensure timely control and isolation of 
services. Explore the feasibility of expanding procedures for contact with Con 
Ed (Electric) Control Center and Substation Shift Managers to include gas, 
water and other utilities. Establish methods for secondary and tertiary means 
of communication should cell phone service be disrupted.  
12. The focus group shall confer with NYC DOB and dispatchers to determine 
the possibility of establishing rapid-assessment teams to respond to pre-
designated access points within the five boroughs in order to prioritize 
emergency resource allocation. 
13. The focus group shall confer with NYC DOB to determine existing 
procedures of marking damaged buildings in an emergency, and if none, 
establish such procedures. FDNY operating procedures shall be adjusted with 
this in mind. 
14. The focus group shall review international best practices for earthquake 
response and feasibility of using these procedures in NYC. 
15. The focus group, through OEM, shall legally determine a lead agency for an 
earthquake response, while maintaining current policies of the Incident 
Command System and specific agency core competencies. 
16. Utilize the chain-of-command to identify hardened structures that can serve as 
possible primary, secondary and tertiary command centers.   
17. The focus group shall establish a comprehensive list of all FDNY facilities 
with working emergency generators and identify other public and private 
buildings with this level of resiliency. 
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18. The focus group shall establish a comprehensive list of all natural, dependable 
water sources for fire suppression and identify key problem areas in need of 
expedient water delivery in the event of an earthquake. 
19. The focus group shall contact volunteer organizations and private 
corporations to include these crucial components of the overall response 
system in exercises, while offering them guidance and advice in their own 
emergency response policies. 
20. FDNY lawyers shall evaluate the legality of establishing curfews as the focus 
groups work with NYPD counterparts to identify problem areas and establish 
a working relationship.  
21. The focus group shall include the NYPD in table-top exercises and modify 
current FDNY/NYPD procedures to include operations during periods of 
disaster-related civil disobedience. 
22. Utilize FDNY lawyers and the focus group, in consultation with the City 
Council and OEM, to discuss the possibility of increasing penalties for crimes 
during “states of emergency.” 
23. Compare existing OEM stockpiled emergency supplies to what may be 
needed following an earthquake. Explore the feasibility of altering the amount 
and type of supplies and medicine for an “all hazards” approach. Determine 
the usefulness of current FDNY BIOPOD procedures in disseminating 
medicine and vaccines in the event of an earthquake. 
24. Review current designated flood zones in NYC and compare these locations 
to areas expected to be flooded in the event of a tsunami. Analyze current 
evacuation plans for these zones and explore the possibility of managing this 
evacuation with little or no warning. 
 
These implementations will require time and personnel. What they will not 
require, however, is a substantial amount of funding. Extensive Department-wide training 
and issuance of new equipment is not necessary. The only costs that the Department will 
incur is the utilization of a small number of individuals, which could be used for staffing 
out in the field, to spend their full time and energy as part of the focus group. This 
minimal amount of money can be obtained from the FDNY’s annual budget, thus 
preparing the FDNY for the high-risk, low probability earthquake without much political 
and media opposition. 
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Like the attacks of September 11, 2001, NYC is prone to nearly inconceivable 
existential threats. With proper training and education, however, knowledgeable and 
experienced emergency managers can formulate strategies to deal with potential 
problems following the next black swan. America’s largest city should not be caught off-
guard under any circumstances. A moderate to severe earthquake is a high risk, low 
frequency event. As previously stated, the August 10, 1884, M 5.2 quake with an 
epicenter in New York Harbor may occur once every 50 to 100 years, with a stronger M 
6 quake potentially striking every 400 to 500 years. It is already well over 100 years and 
one can only guess when a potential M 6 quake will strike.310 Because of the low 
frequency of this event in an average citizen’s lifetime, it would be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to demand resources and economic aid for preparation. What can be 
done, however, is emulate successful preparatory efforts taken by other countries in order 
to have first responders perform efficiently and safely. Pre-planning and table-top 
exercises need to be conducted among the highest levels of emergency managers, 
anticipating challenges and reviewing options based on resources currently on hand. By 
doing so, NYC response agencies will save more lives and return the city to normalcy as 
quickly as possible. 
                                                 
310 It is important to note here that this timetable does not actually increase the probability of the event 




APPENDIX  LESSONS LEARNED IN CASE STUDIES  
Table 8.   Recommendations Based on “Lessons Learned” in Case Studies. 
 




Plan for quick, efficient aid from local, military and 
international experts. 
X X  X  
Explore the possibility of setting up a temporary field 
hospital.   
   X  
Explore the possibility of utilizing open waterways for 
medical ocean vessels, military ships and boats distributing 
large amounts of resources. Also consider the feasibility of 
commandeering existing commercial vessels for emergency 
transportation and use. 
X     
Explore the possibility of using local helicopters for survey 
and to bypass damaged roads. 
X     
Pre-plan open, wide areas, with unimpeded access routes for 
mustering of emergency responders. 
 X   X 
Plan for extensive, city-wide resource management such as 
distributed food & water. 
 X    
Review procedures for declaring a “state of emergency” 
early, when the need is evident. 
 X  X  
Evaluate special hazards city-wide (chemical plants, areas 
with extensive excavation work). 
 X X   
Analyze the potential of using local, undamaged medical 
clinics for emergency treatment as well as trained medical 
professionals. 
   X  
Establish rapport with private companies (including 
infrastructure & utility companies) to ensure emergency 
resource allocation, transportation and infrastructure repair 
can be quickly accomplished.  
  X X X 
Maintain points-of-contact are established with infrastructure 
supervisors to ensure the timely isolation of gas, power, 
water, electric and other utilities, when necessary. Ensure 
resilient means of communicating with these individuals. 
  X X  
Establish a method whereby structural engineers can ensure a 
quick survey of designated access points (bridges, roads and 
tunnels) for use by emergency responders. 
   X  
Identify procedures to assess the integrity of damaged 
buildings and the use of easily-identifiable methods 
(numbers, letters, or colors) to assign hazard levels post-
disaster. 
   X  
Follow international best practices for earthquake response.    X  
Pre-plan for a designated Lead Agency.      X  
Identify and pre-determine possible command centers 
(strong, resilient structures).   
   X  
Identify areas and buildings with back-up generators.    X  
Pre-plan additional dependable water sources for fire     X 
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Contact Volunteer & Business organizations (and possibly 
include them in tabletop exercises.) 
  X  X 
Evaluate the feasibility of establishing curfews.   X    
Discuss law enforcement options for force protection and 
review existing procedures. 
   X  
Brainstorm the possibility of increasing penalties for crimes 
during “states of emergency.” 
 X    
Plan to stockpile anticipated emergency supplies and 
medicine specific for an earthquake response.  
   X  
Plan for the possibility of a tsunami and its associated 
hazards should one strike NYC coastal areas concurrent 
with, or subsequent to, a large earthquake. 
  X   
 
Table 9.   Hazard Scores of Each Borough. 
 
 Vulnerabilities Manhattan Bronx Brooklyn Queens Staten 
Island 
Population 3 2 5 4 1 
Subway System 5 2 4 3 1 
Electric 5 2 4 3 1 
Steam 3 1 2 2 1 
Water 2 2 2 2 1 
Sewer 4 5 2 3 1 
Gas 3 3 3 3 3 
Pipelines 1 2 2 2 2 
Bridges/Tunnels 5 3 4 2 4 
Buildings 5 3 4 4 1 
Communications 1 1 1 1 1 
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